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Abstract
We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a market mechanism,
focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. The majority of the economics and mechanism design
literature has focused on linear prices, meaning that the cost of a good is proportional to the
quantity purchased. Equilibria for linear prices are known to be exactly the maximum Nash
welfare allocations.
Price curves allow the cost of a good to be any (increasing) function of the quantity pur-
chased. We show that price curve equilibria are not limited to maximum Nash welfare allocations
with two main results. First, we show that an allocation can be supported by strictly increasing
price curves if and only if it is group-domination-free. A similarly characterization holds for
weakly increasing price curves. We use this to show that given any allocation, we can compute
strictly (or weakly) increasing price curves that support it (or show that none exist) in polyno-
mial time. These results involve a connection to the agent-order matrix of an allocation, which
may have other applications. Second, we use duality to show that in the bandwidth allocation
setting, any allocation maximizing a CES welfare function can be supported by price curves.
1 Introduction
In a market, buyers and sellers exchange goods according to some sort of pricing system. One of the
most important concepts in the study of markets is market equilibrium, which describes when the
supply provided by the sellers and the demands of the buyers exactly match. Market equilibrium
theory dates back to Walras’s seminal work in 1874 [32]. In 1954, Arrow and Debreu finally showed
that under some mild assumptions, a market equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for a wide class of
utility functions [1]. This includes Leontief utilities, which will be our focus.
The simplest mathematical model of a market is a Fisher market, first proposed in 1891 by
Irving Fisher (see [6] for a modern introduction). A Fisher market consists of a set of goods
available for sale, and a set of agents, each with a fixed amount of money to spend. It is usually
assumed that agents have no value for leftover money. In Fisher markets, each good j has a single
real-number price pj, and the cost of buying some quantity x of good j is pj · x. We refer to
such prices as linear, meaning that the cost is proportional to the quantity purchased. A market
equilibrium assigns a price to each good such that when each agent purchases her favorite bundle
of goods that is affordable under these prices, the demand exactly matches the supply.
There are three motivations behind this work. First, in real market economies, prices are often
not linear, and depend on the quantity purchased1. We refer to prices of this form as price curves.
1One consequence of this is that there can be an incentive for agents to “team up”, which is not the case in linear
pricing. For example, it could be cheaper for one person to purchase the resource in bulk and then distribute it, as
opposed to each person buying her own: imagine ordering pizza for a party. We do not consider strategic behavior
in this paper; see Section 2.1 for additional discussion.
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For example, “buying in bulk” may allow agents to purchase twice as much of some resource for less
than twice the price. In this case, the marginal price decreases as more of the good is purchased.
On the other hand, for a scarce resource, a central authority may choose to impose increasing
marginal costs to ensure that no single individual can monopolize the resource. Israel’s pricing
policy for a water is a good example of this, where each additional unit of water costs more than
the previous one [3]. A tremendous amount of work has been devoted to understanding the nature
of linear prices, despite the pervasiveness of price curves in the real world. This paper attempts to
ask the same fundamental questions of price curves that have been answered for linear prices.
Second, imagine a social planner or mechanism designer who wishes to design a pricing scheme
that will maximize some objective function. The objective function of a social planner is typically
referred to as welfare. There are many different social welfare functions, the most well studied being
utilitarian welfare (the sum of agent utilities), Nash welfare (the product of agent utilities) [19, 16],
and max-min welfare (the minimum agent utility [24, 27, 28])2. Max-min welfare can be seen as
caring only about equality across individuals. The utilitarian welfare measures overall good across
the entire population, possibly at the expense of certain individuals. The Nash welfare is something
of a compromise between these two extremes.
Eisenberg and Gale famously showed that for linear prices and a large class of agent utilities
(including Leontief), the market equilibria correspond exactly to the allocations maximizing Nash
welfare [10, 11]. This result is powerful, but also limiting: what if the social planner wishes to
maximize a different welfare function? Is it possible that using price curves instead of linear prices
allows a wider set of allocations to be equilibria? In particular, are there welfare functions other than
Nash welfare such that welfare-maximizing allocations can always be supported by price curves?
(We say that an allocation can be supported by price curves if there exist prices curves that make
that allocation an equilibrium.) Our paper answers these questions in the affirmative.
The third motivation involves a more conceptual connection between markets and welfare func-
tions, both of which have been extensively studied in the economics literature. We know that linear-
pricing equilibria correspond to maximizing Nash welfare, but does this connection go deeper? Our
work hints at an affirmative answer to this question as well.
1.1 Bandwidth allocation
Resource allocation with Leontief utilities generalizes the problem of network bandwidth allocation,
which is a well-studied area in its own right (for example, the work of Kelly [17] on proportional
fairness). In bandwidth allocation, each agent wishes to transmit data along a fixed route of
links, and thus desires bandwidth for exactly those links in equal amounts. In our setting, each
link corresponds to a good, and the agent has unweighted Leontief utility over the set of goods
corresponding to her desired route.
In the bandwidth allocation setting, price curves correspond naturally to a signaling mechanism
that provides congestion signals (eg. in the form of a packet mark or drop) and an end-point protocol
such as TCP [7] corresponds naturally to agent responses. While it was understood that different
marking schemes (such as RED and CHOKe [13, 21]) and variants of TCP lead to different social
welfare objectives (eg. [20]), a market-based understanding was developed only for Nash Welfare,
starting with the seminal work of Kelly et al. [17].
2The utilitarian welfare is also known as the Benthamite welfare, after Jeremy Bentham. The max-min welfare is
also known as the Rawlsian welfare, after John Rawls, or the egalitarian welfare.
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1.2 CES welfare functions
For any constant ρ ∈ (−∞, 0)∪ (0, 1], the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) welfare function
is given by (∑
i∈N
uρi
)1/ρ
where ui is agent i’s utility, and ρ ∈ R is the elasticity parameter. Setting ρ = 1 yields utilitarian
welfare, and taking limits as ρ goes to −∞ and 0 yields max-min welfare and Nash welfare, respec-
tively. This class of welfare functions was first proposed by Atkinson [2], although he did not call
it by the same name. The smaller ρ is, the more the social planner cares about individual equality
(max-min welfare being the extreme case of this), and the larger ρ is, the more the social planner
cares about overall societal good (utilitarian welfare being the extreme case of this). The CES
welfare function (as opposed to the CES agent utility function) has received very little attention in
the computational economics community, despite being well-studied in the traditional economics
literature [2, 5].
These welfare functions also admit an axiomatic characterization:
1. Monotonicity: if one agent’s utility increases while all others are unchanged, the welfare
function should prefer the new allocation.
2. Symmetry: the welfare function should treat all agents the same.
3. Continuity: the welfare function should be continuous.
4. Independence of common scale: scaling all agent utilities by the same factor should not affect
which allocations have better welfare than others.
5. Independence of unconcerned agents: when comparing the welfare of two allocations, the
comparison should not depend on agents who have the same utility in both allocations.
6. The Pigou-Dalton principle: all things being equal, the welfare function should prefer more
equitable allocations [8, 23].
Up to monotonic transformations of the welfare function (which of course do not affect which
allocations have better welfare than others), the set of welfare functions that satisfy these axioms
is exactly the set of CES welfare functions with ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1], including Nash welfare [18]3.
This axiomatic characterization shows that we are not just focusing on an arbitrary class of welfare
functions: CES welfare functions really are the welfare functions.
2 Results and prior work
We assume throughout the paper that agents have Leontief utility functions. An agent with a
Leontief utility function desires the goods in fixed proportions, e.g., one unit of CPU for every two
units of RAM. We can express agent i’s utility as
min
j∈M :wij 6=0
xij
wij
where xij is the amount of good j agent i receives, and wij is agent i’s (nonnegative) weight for
good j. The setting where wij ∈ {0, 1} for all i and j is also known as bandwidth allocation.
3This actually does not include max-min welfare, which obeys weak monotonicity but not strict monotonicity.
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Leontief utilities exhibit certain convenient properties that other utility functions do not. In
particular, such an agent will always purchase her goods exactly in the same proportions, and all
that changes is how much she purchases. We also assume that each agent has the same amount of
money to spend. However, most of our results do extend to the case of unequal budgets, as noted
later on.
We now describe our two main results.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of price curves. Section 4
presents our first main result, which concerns the first motivation described above: trying to
understand fundamental properties of price curve equilibria. In particular, this section answers the
following question: given some allocation, is there a way to tell whether there exist price curves that
make this allocation an equilibrium? Furthermore, can such price curves be efficiently computed?
The answer boils down to a property we call group-domination-freeness. Roughly, a set of
agents a group-dominates a set of agents b if these sets are the same size, but for every good j
and every threshold τ ∈ R≥0, the number of agents in a receiving at least of τ of good j is at
least as large as the number of agents in b receiving at least τ of good j. The formal definition of
group domination is given in Section 4. An allocation is group-domination-free (GDF) if no group
dominates any other group. We show that an allocation can be supported by strictly increasing
price curves if and only if the allocation is GDF (Theorem 4.3)4. This characterization results
in a polynomial time algorithm to compute the underlying price curves or show that none exist
(Theorem 4.4). Appendix A gives an analogous characterization theorem and polynomial time
algorithm for weakly increasing price curves (Theorems A.2 and A.3).
Although the definition of group domination may seem slightly technical, we also demonstrate
its relation to the concept of stochastic dominance, and argue that it may in fact be interpreted as
a fairness notion. The stochastic dominance interpretation will also suggest that group domination
is quite a strong property, and hence group-domination-freeness is a quite a weak assumption.
The proof of these characterization theorems involves the construction of a special matrix we
call the agent-order matrix A, which is a function of the allocation. We show that existence of
strictly increasing price curves is captured by strongly positive solutions (every entry of the solution
vector is positive) to Ay = 0. We relate group-domination-freeness to a property of this matrix,
and then invoke a duality theorem equivalent to Farkas’s Lemma [22] to complete the proof. The
algorithm for computing price curves is a linear program involving the agent-order matrix.
Maximum CES welfare allocations can be supported in bandwidth allocation. Our
second main result concerns the second and third motivations: a social planner who wishes to
maximize a welfare function other than Nash welfare, and understanding the connection between
markets and welfare functions. We know that the maximum Nash welfare allocations can be
supported by linear prices. If we allow price curves, are there other welfare functions whose maxima
can be supported?
First, we will need some assumption on the agents’ weights. To see this, consider just two
agents and one good. Since the agents have the same budget, they must receive equal amounts of
the good no matter the price curve. However, if one agent derives less utility per unit of the good,
this allocation doesn’t maximize any CES welfare function except for Nash welfare5. One natural
way to handle this is to assume that the agents’ weight vectors are normalized in some manner.
The bandwidth allocation setting – wij ∈ {0, 1} for all i and j – constitutes one such possibility.
Our second main result is that in the bandwidth allocation setting, the welfare-maximizing
4This result extends to the setting of unequal budgets if one instead considers “budget-weighted group-domination-
freeness”. We elaborate on this in Section 4.
5This example actually holds for a much wider class of utilities, not just Leontief. This is because for a single
good, all anyone can do is buy as much of that good as they can.
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agent 1 agent 2 agent 3
good 1 1 0 1
good 2 0 1 1
Example 1: A bandwidth allocation instance where no maximum utilitarian welfare allocation can be sup-
ported. The table above gives each agent’s weight wij ∈ {0, 1} for each good. Utilitarian welfare is maximized
by giving all of good 1 to agent 1 and all of good 2 to agent 2, leaving agent 3 with nothing. This is impossible
to support with price curves, because agent 3 can always buy a nonzero amount of the goods she wants.
allocations for any fixed CES welfare function with ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) can be supported by price
curves (Theorem 6.1). We prove this by writing a convex program to maximize CES welfare, and
using duality to construct explicit price curves. Furthermore, these price curves take on a natural
form: the cost of buying x of good j is qjx
1−ρ, where qj ≥ 0 is a constant derived from the dual
6.
This result can be thought of as extending the work on price-based congestion control (pioneered
by Kelly et al. [17]) beyond Nash welfare to almost all CES welfare functions.
We also prove a converse of sorts: if an allocation x can be supported by price curves of
the form qjx
1−ρ, and the supply is exhausted for every good with nonzero price (i.e., qj 6= 0),
then x is a maximum CES welfare allocation (Theorem 6.2). This is analogous to the famous
result of Eisenberg and Gale: the linear-pricing equilibrium allocations are exactly the allocations
maximizing Nash welfare [10, 11].
One may wonder if Theorem 6.1 could be extended to ρ = 1, i.e., maximizing the sum of utilities.
Example 1 shows that the answer is no, unfortunately. One may also wonder if Theorem 6.1 would
generalize if we relax our constraint from wij ∈ {0, 1} to wij ∈ [0, 1]. The answer is again no; this
counterexample is more involved and is given by Theorem C.1 in Section C.
Additional results. We prove several additional results. We consider max-min welfare in
Section 5, and show that as long as agents’ weights are reasonably normalized, allocations with
optimal max-min welfare can be supported. In Appendix B, we use the characterization theorem for
weakly increasing price curves (Theorem A.2) to prove several results about CES welfare functions.
First, we provide an alternative proof of the bandwidth setting result (although this proof only holds
for ρ < 0). We then show that for two agents whose weights are normalized in any reasonable way,
any maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported. We also show that when agents’ weights
are normalized with respect to ρ itself, any maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported.
These arguments are quite technically involved, with L’Hoˆpital’s rule making a surprising cameo
appearance.
2.1 Prior work
The study of markets has a long history in the economics literature [32, 30, 1, 6]. Recently, this
topic has received significant attention in the computer science community as well (see [31] for an
algorithmic exposition). The vast majority of the literature has focused on linear prices, but there
are some papers that consider more complex pricing schemes. One such paper is [14], which showed
that for linear but fully personalized prices (i.e., we can independently assign different prices to
different agents for the same good), one can support any Pareto optimal allocation. One drawback
of fully personalized prices is that we lose any claim to fairness, since agents may be subjected to
totally different prices for the same resource. Price curves are personalized in a much weaker sense:
6These results extend to agents with unequal budgets if we instead consider the “budget-weighted CES welfare”,
i.e.,
(∑
i∈N Biu
ρ
i
)1/ρ
, where Bi is agent i’s budget. We discuss this in Section 6.2. The price curves will take the
exact same form.
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the cost of a good depends only on how much you buy of that good, not on who you are or how
much you buy of another good.
The concept of a social welfare function – a function which encapsulates a societal value system
– was first proposed in 1938 [4], and further developed by [25]. For brevity, we will just refer
to them as welfare functions. Since then, several different welfare functions have been proposed,
the most well-studied being utilitarian welfare, Nash welfare [19, 16], and max-min welfare (the
minimum agent utility) [24, 27, 28]. The class of CES welfare functions was first proposed by [2]
and further developed by [5], although not under the same name. See [18] for a modern discussion
of welfare functions.
We briefly mention an important property in mechanism design: strategy-proofness. A mech-
anism is strategy-proof if agents can never improve their utility by lying about their preferences.
Unfortunately, even in simple settings, the only mechanism for resource allocation that can simulta-
neously guarantee strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality is dictatorial, meaning that one agent
receives all of the resources [26]. This is clearly unacceptable, so we sacrifice strategy-proofness
in favor of Pareto optimality. Specifically, we assume throughout the paper that agents always
truthfully report their preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 formally defines the model.
Section 4 presents our first main result: that for strictly increasing price curves, an allocation can
be supported if and only if it is group-domination-free. In Section 5, we use this characterization
to show that allocations with optimal max-min welfare can be supported by price curves in a
wide range of settings. Section 6 gives our second main result: that in the bandwidth allocation
setting, every maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves. At this point
we conclude the main paper, and move on to supplementary results. In Appendix A, we generalize
our characterization theorem from Section 4 to account for weakly increasing price curves. We use
this theorem to prove several more results about CES welfare in Appendix B. Appendix C provides
counterexamples to various claims that one might have hoped to prove. We also discuss in that
section why certain other classes of utilities – in particular, linear utilities – are much more difficult
to analyze. Finally, Appendix D provides some proofs that are omitted from earlier sections.
3 Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents, and let M be a set of divisible goods, where |M | = m.
Throughout the paper, we use i and k to refer to agents and j and ℓ to refer to goods. Let sj be
the available supply of good j.7 The social planner needs to determine an allocation x ∈ Rn×m≥0 ,
where xi ∈ R
m
≥0 is the bundle of agent i, and xij ∈ [0, sj ] is the fraction of good j allocated to agent
i. An allocation cannot allocate more than the available supply: x is a valid allocation if and only
if
∑
i xij ≤ sj for all j.
Agent i’s utility for a bundle xi is denoted by ui(xi) ∈ R≥0. The literature studies many
subclasses of utility functions. For example, Leontief utilities have the form
ui(xi) = min
j∈M :wij 6=0
xij
wij
where wij represents the weight agent i has for good j. For brevity, we will usually write ui(xi) =
minj∈M
xij
wij
and leave the wij 6= 0 condition implicit. The same holds for other contexts where
7It is common to normalize the supply of each good to 1, but this is not possible when weights are restricted to
be either 0 or 1.
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we are dividing by a value wij that may be zero. We assume that agents have Leontief utilities
throughout the paper, and we assume that each agent has nonzero weight for at least one good.
Just as agents have utilities over the bundles they receive, we can imagine a social planner
who wishes to design a pricing mechanism to maximize some societal welfare function Φ(x). One
can think of Φ as the social planner’s utility function, which takes as input the agent utilities,
instead of a bundle of goods. The most well-studied welfare functions are the max-min welfare
Φ(x) = mini∈N ui(xi), the Nash welfare Φ(x) =
(∏
i∈N ui
)1/n
, and the utilitarian welfare Φ(x) =∑
i∈N ui(xi).
8 These three welfare functions can be generalized by a CES welfare function:
Φ(x) =
(∑
i∈N
ui(xi)
ρ
)1/ρ
where ρ is a constant in (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1].
3.1 Fisher markets
The simplest market model is a Fisher market [6]. In a Fisher market, each good is available for
sale and each agent enters the market with a fixed budget she wishes to spend. It is assumed
that agents have no value for leftover money; this will imply that each agent always spends her
entire budget. Unless otherwise stated, we will assume that all agents have the same budget, and
normalize all budgets to 1 without loss of generality.
Informally, a Fisher market equilibrium assigns a price pj ∈ R≥0 to each good j so that the
agents’ demand equals supply. Formally, for a price vector p ∈ Rm≥0, the cost of bundle xi is
Cp(xi) =
∑
j∈M xijpj. Bundle xi is affordable for agent i if Cp(xi) ≤ 1. Agent i’s demand set is
the set of her favorite affordable bundles, i.e.,
Di(p) = argmax
xi∈Rm≥0: Cp(xi)≤1
ui(xi).
If pj > 0 for all j ∈M , an agent with Leontief utility will always purchase in exact proportion
to her weights: since agent i’s utility is determined by minj∈M
xij
wij
, violating these proportions
cannot increase her utility. Thus when discussing an arbitrary allocation x, we assume that each
bundle xi is in proportion to agent i’s weights: otherwise there is no hope of supporting such an
allocation. For brevity, we leave this assumption implicit through the paper, rather than always
stating “for an arbitrary allocation x where each bundle is in proportion to agent i’s weights”.
The careful reader may note that we are glossing over a detail: if pj = 0 for some good j, agent
i can add more of good j to her bundle at no additional cost. This does not affect agent utilities at
all, but is technically possible. In order to avoid handling this uninteresting and sometimes messy
edge case, we assume throughout the paper that for agents with Leontief utilities, demand sets and
arbitrary allocations are always in exact proportion to agent weights.
Formally, a Fisher market equilibrium (x,p) is an allocation x and price vector p ∈ Rm≥0 such
that
1. Each agent receives a bundle in her demand set: xi ∈ Di(p).
2. The market clears: for all j ∈M ,
∑
i∈N xij ≤ sj, and if pj > 0, then
∑
i∈N xij = sj.
8One could also imagine the (arguably less natural) case of a social planner who cares about some agents’ utilities
more than others, which would manifest as weights in her utility function. We briefly consider this case in the setting
of CES welfare with unequal budgets (Section 6.2).
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When all agents have the same budget, this is also called the competitive equilibrium from equal
incomes [30].
For a wide class of agent utilities, including Leontief utilities, an equilibrium is guaranteed to
exist [1]9. Furthermore, the equilibrium allocations are the exactly the allocations which maximize
Nash welfare10. This is made explicit by the celebrated Eisenberg-Gale convex program [10, 11],
and combinatorial approaches to computing market equilibria [9, 15].
3.2 Price curves
Our paper considers an expanded model where instead of assigning a single price pj ∈ R≥0 to each
good, we assign each good a price curve fj : R≥0 → R≥0. The function fj expresses the cost of
good j as a function of the quantity purchased. When we say “price curve”, we mean a function
fj that is weakly increasing (buying more of a good cannot cost less), normalized (fj(0) = 0), and
continuous. Setting fj(x) = pj · x for all j ∈M and all x ∈ R≥0 yields the Fisher market setting.
Given a vector of price curves f = (f1, . . . , fm), the cost of a bundle xi is now Cf (xi) =∑
j∈M fj(xij). Although the functions fj may not be linear, the cost of a bundle is still additive
across goods. Each agent’s demand set is defined identically to the Fisher market setting: Di(f) =
argmax
xi∈Rm≥0: Cf (xi)≤1
ui(xi).
The demand set is intuitively the same as in the Fisher market setting: each agent purchases
exactly in proportion to her weights, and buys as much as she can without exceeding her budget.
A price curve equilibrium (x, f) is an allocation x and vector of price curves f such that
1. Each agent receives a bundle in her demand set: xi ∈ Di(f).
2. The demand does not exceed supply:
∑
i∈N xij ≤ sj for all j ∈M
11.
We say that price curves f support an allocation x if (x, f) is a price curve equilibrium. The
fundamental question we address in this paper is: what allocations x can be supported?
4 Group domination
Recall that we require price curves to be continuous and weakly increasing. We wish to theoretically
characterize which allocations can be supported by price curves so that we can (1) apply this
characterization in our subsequent proofs, and (2) construct an algorithm which can calculate price
curves in polynomial time.
The true necessary and sufficient condition for an allocation to be supported by price curves
– and an algorithm to compute them – is given in Appendix A. However, this condition (“locked-
agent-freeness”) is somewhat unwieldy. Although weakly increasing price curves are sometimes
9Specifically, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist as long agent utilities are continuous, quasi-concave, and non-
satiated. The full Arrow-Debreu model also allows for agents to enter to market with goods themselves and not only
money; the necessary conditions on utilities are slightly more complex in that setting.
10The conditions for the correspondence between Fisher market equilibria and Nash welfare are slightly stricter
than those for market equilibrium existence, but are still quite general. Sufficient criteria were given in [10] and
generalized slightly by [15].
11For Fisher market equilibria, the second condition also stipulated that whenever pj > 0,
∑
j∈M xij = sj . Without
this additional condition, cranking up all prices to infinity would result in trivial equilibria where all agents purchase
almost nothing and so would certainly not maximize Nash welfare. Such trivial price curve equilibria do exist under
our definition, but since we are not going to make any claims of the form “all price curve equilibria maximize a certain
function”, there is no issue with allowing these trivial equilibria to exist.
8
necessary12, for now we will consider only strictly increasing price curves. The corresponding
necessary and sufficient condition is the cleaner notion of group-domination-freeness.
4.1 Group domination
We have termed the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of strictly increasing price
curves “group-domination-freeness” (GDF). To gain intuition for this condition, consider an alloca-
tion x and agents i, k. We will say that agent i dominates agent k if ∀j xij ≥ xkj and there exists j
for which this inequality is strict. Observe that this would prevent the existence of strictly increas-
ing price curves supporting allocation x – both agents must spend their full budget (otherwise they
could buy more of every good, since price curves are continuous), but agent i buys strictly more
than agent k. A similar scenario arises when considering two weighted groups of agents a,b, which
we can represent as vectors with a non-negative weight13 for each agent, where we require that
a and b have the same total agent-weight. If for every possible quantity τ ∈ R≥0 of any good j,
considering only agents purchasing at least τ of good j, the weight of the agents in a is greater than
or equal to the weight of agents in b, then b can never be made to pay more than a. Essentially,
for each additional δ of any good, as many agents from a must purchase that δ as agents from b, so
no matter how we price these increments, b never pays more. If this difference in weights is strict
for any (j, τ) pair, that implies some δ increment must cost 0 (because the total expenditure of a
and b must be equal), violating the requirement that price curves be strictly increasing.
Another way to gain intuition for group domination is by analogy to stochastic dominance.
Distribution a stochastically dominates distribution b if for every possible payoff τ ∈ R≥0, the
odds of getting at least τ from a are at least as high as the odds of getting at least τ from b.
One consequence of stochastic dominance is that any rational agent should prefer a to b – there
are no trade-offs, a is simply better than (dominant over) b. In fact, we can directly consider
weighted groups of agents as probability distributions. The total weight of each group must be the
same – without loss of generality, equal to 1. Consider sampling the allocations xij for any good
j with probability equal to the weight of each agent. The probability distribution a stochastically
dominating b is exactly equivalent to the weighted group a group-dominating b. Thus not only
does group domination create problems for pricing, it can arguably be considered unfair, as a is in
some sense objectively better-off than b14.
The formal definition of this condition is below.
Definition 4.1 (Group-domination-free (GDF)). Let a = (a1, . . . , an) and b = (b1, . . . , bn) be
vectors in Rn≥0 that assign a (possibly zero) weight to each agent, such that
∑
i∈N ai =
∑
i∈N bi.
Then a group-dominates b in an allocation x (denoted a ≻ b) if for all j ∈M and for any threshold
τ ∈ R≥0, ∑
i∈N : xij≥τ
ai ≥
∑
i∈N : xij≥τ
bi
and there exists a (j, τ) pair where the inequality is strict. x is group-domination-free if there do
not exist vectors a,b ∈ Rn≥0 such that a ≻ b in x.
15
12Consider an instance with two agents and two goods, each with supply 1. Let the agents’ weights be given by
w11 = w21 = w12 = 1 and w22 = 0. Nash welfare is maximized by splitting good 1 evenly between the two agents, and
allowing agent 1 to purchase an equal quantity of good 2. This only possible if the price of good 2 is zero: otherwise,
agent 1 is paying more than agent 2. Recall that the Fisher market equilibrium prices are the dual variables of the
convex program for maximizing Nash welfare: thus the price of good 2 being zero corresponds to the fact that the
supply constraint for good 2 is not tight in this instance.
13Note that this is not the same weight as the wij representing an agent’s weight for a good.
14See [12] for an introduction to stochastic dominance.
15The “-free/-freeness” suffix may remind some readers of the popular fairness notion envy-freeness; this connection
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We will also assume without loss of generality that for all i ∈ N , at least one of ai and bi is
zero, i.e., these are non-overlapping weighted groups: were this not the case, we could define a′ and
b′ by a′i = ai−min(ai, bi) and b
′
i = bi−min(ai, bi), and we would have a
′ ≻ b′ if and only if a ≻ b.
Theorem 4.3 will show that an allocation can be supported with strictly increasing price curves
if and only if it is GDF.
4.2 Characterization of allocations supported by strictly increasing price curves
In order to relate the existence of price curves to GDF, first observe that, for agents with Leontief
utilities, the conditions for a price curve equilibrium take on a relatively simple form. Recall that
by assumption, the allocation to be considered doesn’t violate supply, and each agent purchases
goods in exact proportion to her weights wij (see Section 3.1). Then the condition that xi ∈ Di(f)
for all i can be captured by Lemma 4.1, whose proof appears in Appendix D. Intuitively, agent i
fills up her bundle in proportion to her weights until (a) she reaches her budget and (b) there exists
a good where buying more would cost more.
Lemma 4.1. Given price curves f , xi ∈ Di(f) if and only if both of the following hold: (a)
Cf (xi) = 1, and (b) there exists j ∈M such that for all ε > 0, fj(xij + εwij) > fj(xij).
We are now almost ready to prove Theorem 4.3 relating the existence of price curves to GDF.
However, the proof is rather intricate, so we begin by giving an intuitive overview thereof. Through-
out, we will refer to the example allocation x shown in Figure 1a to make the argument concrete.
(Note that the example allocation shown in the figure implicitly defines a corresponding Leontief
utility function for each agent, up to scaling by a constant, since we assume each agent fills up her
bundle in exact proportion to her weights wij .)
We will now use this example to illustrate three key observations regarding the existence of
strictly increasing price curves supporting an allocation x: (1) Only the points on the price curves
corresponding to agent allocations matter. (2) Only the order of the agents along the price curve
for each good, not their absolute allocations, matters. (3) The order of the agents can be captured
in an agent-order matrix such that weighted column and row sums represent agent costs and group
dominations, respectively.
First we address observation (1). Consider the possible price curves shown in Figure 1c. Given
the price that each agent pays for each good, these are the only points that matter, in the sense
that (a) each agent’s total cost, which must equal 1, depends only on these points, and (b) an agent
must be able to purchase more of a good if the next fixed point on that curve has the same price,
and otherwise need not be able to do so, for instance if we make the price curves piece-wise linear
as shown. Thus when considering whether price curves are possible, we need only consider the set
of prices corresponding to agent allocations.
A similar argument addresses observation (2). As long as we fix the order of points along a
price curve, we can change the allocations arbitrarily (assuming they still obey the supply and
proportional-purchase assumptions) without changing the prices. Obviously, every agent will still
incur a cost of 1, and it will not change whether an agent can purchase more of a good (whether
the next point along the curve has the same price).
is intended. If one agent does envy another, this constitutes an instance of group domination in the allocation, so
GDF implies envy-freeness. However, the reverse is not true: for an agent i to envy agent k, k must receive strictly
more of every good i cares about; for group domination, the difference need only be strict on one good. All market
equilibria are envy-free; GDF is a stronger notion corresponding exactly the the existence of a market equilibrium in
this setting.
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good 1 good 2 good 3
agent 1 0.6 0 0.2
agent 2 0.3 0 0
agent 3 0.1 1 0.4
agent 4 0 0 0.4
(a) example allocation x
good 1 good 2 good 3

1 1 1 0 1 0 -1

1 1 0 0 0 0 -11 0 0 1 1 1 -1
0 0 0 0 1 1 -1
(b) x represented as an agent-order matrix A
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
allocation of good 1
p
ri
ce
agent 4
agent 3
agent 2
agent 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
allocation of good 2
agents 1,2,4
agent 3
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
allocation of good 3
agent 2
agent 1
agents 3,4
(c) example price curves for allocation x
Figure 1: An illustrative example allocation and the construction of the corresponding agent-order matrix.
Finally, we come to the more complicated observation (3). We will first lay out how the agent-
order matrix is constructed, then illustrate its connection to both prices and group domination. The
matrix will have n rows, one for each agent, and a sub-block for each good, as shown in Figure 1b.
Within a sub-block, each column will correspond to a non-zero agent allocation (i.e., the non-zero
points shown in Figure 1c). The entry corresponding to agent i, good j, and allocation threshold
τ ∈ R≥0 will equal 1 if xij ≥ τ and 0 otherwise. Essentially, this will indicate which agent pays
the cost of the first, second, etc. section of each price curve. Additionally, we append a column
of −1’s to the end of the matrix. To see the connection to prices, consider a vector y such that
Ay = 0,y 6= 0. For instance, Figure 2a exhibits such a vector y for the matrix A shown in Figure 1b.
y will represent prices, so we require all the entries to be non-negative, denoted y ≥ 0; for strictly
increasing price curves, we require y to be strongly positive16, denoted y≫ 0. Specifically, within
each block (corresponding to a good j), the first entry represents the cost of increasing from 0
of good j to the first non-zero point on the price curve, the second entry represents the cost of
increasing from the first point to the second point, and so on. The last entry in y, which we can
assume equals 1 without loss of generality, represents the total cost expended by each agent. Thus
Ay = 0 ensures that each agent spends exactly 1 unit of money. (Ensuring that condition (b) of
Lemma 4.1 be met is slightly more complicated. However, for strictly increasing price curves, it is
trivially satisfied.)
Thus we can see that the column sums of the agent-order matrix correspond to agent expendi-
tures, where the weight of each column in the sum corresponds to a section of the price curve. Row
sums, however, correspond to group domination. To see the connection, consider a vector z such
that AT z is strictly positive17, denoted AT z > 0. For instance, Figure 2b exhibits such a vector z
for the matrix A shown in Figure 1b. In a given z, the positive entries correspond to the weighted
agents in a dominating group a, while the (absolute value of the) negative entries are the weighted
16Recall that a strongly positive vector has every entry greater than 0.
17Recall that a strictly positive vector has entries in R≥0 with at least one entry non-zero.
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

1 1 1 0 1 0 −1
1 1 0 0 0 0 −1
1 0 0 1 1 1 −1
0 0 0 0 1 1 −1

×


0
1
0
0
0
1
1


= 0
(a) column sum of A implies price curves
(in this example, weakly increasing)


1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
−1 −1 −1 −1


×


1
−1
0
0

 =


0
0
1
0
1
0
0


(b) row sum of A implies group domination
(precludes strictly increasing price curves)
Figure 2: Example row and column sums of the agent-order matrix from Figure 1b.
agents in group b. Since the last entry of AT z must be nonnegative, the total weight of b is at least
as large as that of a. And since AT z > 0, all the entries are non-negative and at least one other
entry must be positive. This means that at every point on a price curve (any j, τ), the weight of
group a purchasing at least τ of good j is at least as much as the weight of group b purchasing τ ,
and for some (j, τ) this is strict. Clearly this is equivalent to a ≻ b.
Having constructed the agent-order matrix and related its column and row sums to prices and
group domination, respectively, the final step applies a previously-known duality result equivalent
to Farkas’s Lemma [22], which establishes that valid prices (column sums) exist if and only if group
domination (row sums) do not. Specifically, we make use of the following result originally due to
Stiemke to prove Theorem 4.3.
Lemma 4.2 (1.6.4 in [29]). For a commutative, ordered field F, A a matrix over F, the following
are equivalent: (1) Ay = 0,y≫ 0 has no solution. (2) AT z > 0 has a solution.
Theorem 4.3. Let x be any allocation that obeys the supply constraints and gives at least one
agent a nonempty bundle. Then x be can supported by strictly increasing price curves if and only
if x is GDF.
Proof. Recall that an allocation x can be supported if there exist price curves f such that xi ∈
Di(f) ∀i ∈ N , and
∑
i∈N xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈M (i.e., x obeys the supply constraints). The latter condition
is satisfied by assumption, and by Lemma 4.1, for Leontief utilities and strictly increasing price
curves, the former condition holds if and only if the cost Cf (xi) = 1 ∀i.
Let Xj = {xij | i ∈ N} \ {0} be the set of distinct, non-zero amounts of good j allocated to
some agent under x. Label the elements of Xj as τ
1
j , τ
2
j , . . . , τ
|Xj |
j such that τ
1
j < τ
2
j < · · · < τ
|Xj |
j .
Since fj(0) = 0, fj(x /∈ Xj) in some sense doesn’t matter – we only require that these “in-between”
areas of the price curve don’t violate continuity and are strictly increasing. Thus there exist strictly
increasing price curves f supporting x if and only if there exist functions f ′j : Xj → R≥0 such that
0 < f ′j(τ
1
j ) < f
′
j(τ
2
j ) < . . . < f
′
j(τ
|Xj |
j ) ∀j and Cf (xi) =
∑
j f
′
j(xij) = 1 ∀i.
Now we are ready to set up the agent-order matrix A ∈ Qn×(
∑
j |Xj |+1) to which we will apply
Lemma 4.2. Since each column will represent an allocation point for a specific good (corresponding
to its sub-block), we will write the column indices as
∑
ℓ<j |Xℓ|+ q, where j indicates the sub-block
and 1 ≤ q ≤ |Xj | is the index within that sub-block.
A

i, ∑
ℓ<j
|Xℓ|+ q

 =


−1 if j = m+ 1, q = 1 (last column)
0 if xij < τ
q
j
1 otherwise
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Thus each row of A represents an agent, and each column (except the last) represents one point of
the functions f ′. Since x gives at least one agent a nonempty bundle by assumption, A has at least
two columns (one allocation point and the column of −1’s). We know by Lemma 4.2 that ∃y≫ 0
such that Ay = 0 if and only if 6 ∃z such that AT z > 0. To complete the proof, we will show that
the former condition is equivalent to the existence of strictly increasing price curves supporting x,
and the latter is equivalent to a group domination.
If ∃y≫ 0 such that Ay = 0, we may assume without loss of generality that the last entry in y is
1. Furthermore, define f ′j(τ
q
j )−f
′
j(τ
q−1
j ) = y
∑
ℓ<j |Xℓ|+q
(for convenience, define f ′j(τ
0
j ) = f
′
j(0) = 0).
Clearly y≫ 0 is equivalent to the requirement that 0 < f ′j(τ
1
j ) < . . . < f
′
j(τ
|Xj |
j ) ∀j. Additionally,
Cf (xi) =
∑
j
fj(xij) =
∑
j
f ′j(xij) =
∑
j
∑
q:xij≥τ
q
j
y∑
ℓ<j |Xℓ|+q
= Aiy+ 1
Thus Ay = 0 is equivalent to the requirement that Cf (xi) = 1 ∀i.
Finally, consider z such that AT z > 0. This is equivalent to a group domination a ≻ b, where
ai = zi if zi > 0, bi = −zi if zi < 0, and all other entries are 0. Consider the product of the
last column of A with z, which equals −
∑
i zi ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we can assume∑
i zi = 0, and thus
∑
i ai =
∑
i bi. If this is not true, then b would have greater weight than a,
and decreasing any weight in b can only increase coordinates of AT z or equivalently widen the gap
between a and b in terms of group domination. Now observe that for any good j and τ ∈ R≥0,∑
i∈N :xij≥τ
(ai − bi) is equal to the dot product of column
∑
ℓ<j |Xℓ|+ q of A by z, where q is the
largest value such that τ qj ≤ τ . This holds because A
[
i,
∑
ℓ<j |Xℓ|+ q
]
is an indicator variable
for xij ≥ τ
q
j , and by construction no agent can have an allocation amount between τ
q
j and τ
q+1
j .
Therefore AT z > 0 is equivalent to the requirement that
∑
i∈N :xij≥τ
(ai − bi) ≥ 0 for all (j, τ) and
that for some (j, τ) this inequality is strict, i.e., AT z > 0 is equivalent to a ≻ b.
Remark. Since the matrix A constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.3 is over the rationals, we can
also assume that the y or z obtained via Lemma 4.2 are over the rationals. In particular, we can
scale z to obtain z′ ∈ Zn with AT z′ > 0. Equivalently, this means that if a ≻ b, we can assume
without loss of generality that ai, bi ∈ Z.
This characterization, in addition to allowing us to prove some of our subsequent results, implies
that we can compute price curves (or show that they do not exist) for a particular instance in
polynomial time. This is exhibited by the following linear program.
Theorem 4.4. Given a set of agents N , goods M , and an allocation x ∈ Rn×m≥0 , let A be the
corresponding agent-order matrix. In the following linear program, the optimal objective value is
strictly positive if and only if there exist strictly increasing price curves supporting x, in which case
y defines such curves.
max
y,η
η
s.t. Ay = 0
yk ≥ η ∀k
y−1 = 1
Proof. As per the proof of Theorem 4.3, there exist strictly increasing price curves supporting x
if and only if there is a solution to the system Ay = 0,y ≫ 0. To turn this into a valid linear
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program, instead of the strict inequality yk > 0 for each coordinate of y, we write yk ≥ η and
attempt to maximize η. Furthermore, we restrict the final entry of y as y−1 = 1, since otherwise
y can be scaled arbitrarily. If there is a solution with η > 0, then y corresponds to price curves as
before, with each entry representing the difference in price between adjacent allocation amounts.
These points simply need to be connected, e.g., in a piecewise linear fashion, to constitute valid
price curves.
One may wonder if Theorem 4.3 generalizes to other classes of utility functions. Unfortunately,
the answer in general is no. Example 3 gives an instance with linear utilities that is GDF, but
cannot be supported by price curves.
In Section 5, we will show how the group-domination-freeness concept can be useful for proving
that allocations of interest can be supported by price curves: specifically, allocations with optimal
(or near optimal) max-min welfare. But first, a word about unequal budgets.
4.3 Unequal budgets
It turns out that the characterization theorem of the previous section easily generalizes to agents
with unequal budgets. Since price curves are strictly increasing, the only additional requirement for
an allocation x to be supported is that each agent spends her entire budget Bi. In the agent-order
matrix, the last column of −1’s corresponded to each agent’s expenditure, so we simply need to
replace −1 with −Bi for each row i.
Following Lemma 4.2 with the modified agent-order matrix, the if-and-only-if characterization
becomes “budget-weighted group-domination-freeness”. A budget-weighted group domination still
requires that for all (j, τ), ∑
i∈N :xij≥τ
ai ≥
∑
i∈N :xij≥τ
bi
and that there exists j, τ where the inequality is strict. The only difference is that instead of
requiring both groups to have the same total weight, that weight is now scaled by each agent’s
budget. That is,
∑
i∈N aiBi =
∑
i∈N biBi. Note that when Bi = 1 for all i, this recovers the
definition of group domination.
5 Warm-up: max-min welfare
In this section, we show that under mild assumptions, price curves can support allocations with
either optimal max-min welfare, or arbitrarily close to optimal max-min welfare. As before, we
assume that agents have Leontief utility functions. Also, we refer to an allocation with optimal
max-min welfare as a max-min allocation. The proof of this turns out to be quite simple, so we
think of this section as a warm-up.
The first thing we observe is that when agent weights are unconstrained in magnitude, there is
no hope to support any approximation of max-min welfare. Consider a single good and two agents
with weights w11 and w21 on that good. In this case, each agent i’s utility is just xi1/wi1, so the
max-min welfare of an allocation x is min( x11w11 ,
x21
w21
). Now imagine that w11 is much larger than
w21: agent 1 needs significantly more of the good to achieve the same utility as agent 2. Then
any max-min allocation (or even any decent approximation) must give more of the good to agent
1 than agent 2. But since agents have the same budgets, any price curve equilibrium must result
in each agent receiving half of the supply of good 1, which is a contradiction.
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Thus in order to have any hope of even approximately supporting a max-min allocation, the
agent weights must be normalized in some way. Theorem 5.1 states that under a quite general
normalization assumption, we can support a max-min allocation.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose there exist strictly increasing functions g1, . . . , gm such that for all i ∈ N ,∑
j∈M gj(wij) = 1. Then there exists a max-min allocation that can be supported by price curves.
Proof. Since the max-min welfare of an allocation is determined by the minimum agent utility,
the max-min welfare cannot be improved by making any agent’s utility higher than any other.
Similarly, since each agent’s utility is determined by minj∈M xij/wij , the max-min welfare cannot
be improved by allocating goods to an agent outside of her desired proportions. Thus there exists
a max-min allocation x where all agents have the same utility u, and where xij = u · wij for all
i ∈ N and j ∈M .
Since GDF is invariant to scaling by constants, this implies that x is GDF if and only if the
weight vectors themselves are GDF. That is, x is GDF if and only if the allocation x′ defined by
x′ij = wij is GDF. One realizes that the assumption of
∑
j∈M gj(wij) = 1 for all i ∈ N is literally
assuming that there exist (strictly increasing) price curves that support the allocation x′. Thus x′
is GDF by Theorem 4.3, so x is GDF, which completes the proof.
One natural corollary of Theorem 5.1 is the following:
Corollary 5.1.1. Suppose there exists some q ≥ 1 so that
∑
j∈M w
q
ij = 1 for all i ∈ N . Then there
exists a max-min allocation that can be supported by price curves.
Theorem 5.1 has an interesting conceptual implication. We can think of price curves themselves
as a sort of “norm” on the allocation, and any allocation for which there is a “norm” which assigns
the same value to each agent’s bundle is reasonable enough that it can be supported by price
curves. The previous statement can be rephrased as “an allocation can be supported by price
curves if and only if there exist price curves which assign the same cost to each agent’s bundle”,
and so is functionally a tautology. Since there exists a max-min allocation which is a constant
scaling of the agent weights, this near-tautology carries over.
One final observation is that there are some interesting norms, such as the L∞ norm, which
cannot be written as the sum of increasing functions. In fact, there are cases where no max-min
allocation can be supported when agent weights have the same L∞ norm.
18 Furthermore, the
following counterexample falls under the even simpler bandwidth allocation setting: wij ∈ {0, 1}
for all i, j.
Theorem 5.2. There exist instances where wij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and j ∈M , but no max-min
allocation can be supported.
Proof. Consider an instance with three agents and two goods, each with supply 1. Let the agent
weights be given by the following table:
agent 1 agent 2 agent 3
good 1 1 0 1
good 2 0 1 1
The unique max-min allocation is x11 = x22 = x31 = x32 =
1
2 . Thus any price curves f1, f2 must
satisfy Cf (x1) = f1(
1
2) = 1, Cf (x2) = f2(
1
2 ) = 1. But then Cf (x3) = f1(
1
2) + f2(
1
2) = 2, which is a
contradiction. Thus no max-min allocation can be supported.
18The L∞ norm is defined as maxj∈M wij .
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The good news is that the L∞ norm can be approximated to arbitrary precision by Lq norms,
leading to the following theorem. We use ΦMM (x) = mini∈N ui(xi) to denote the max-min welfare
of allocation x.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that maxj∈M wij = 1 for all i ∈ N . Then for every ǫ > 0, there exists an
allocation x that can be supported by price curves where ΦMM(x) ≥ (1− ǫ)maxx′ ΦMM (x
′).
With this warm-up in hand, we now move on to our second main result, which concerns CES
welfare functions.
6 CES welfare
In this section, we consider CES welfare functions:
ΦCES(x) =
(∑
i∈N
ui(xi)
ρ
)1/ρ
This section contains our second main result: that in the bandwidth setting (i.e., agents have
Leontief utilities where wij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N , j ∈ M), for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), any
maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves (Theorem 6.1). Our proof
uses the dual of the convex program for maximizing CES welfare to construct explicit price curves
that support a maximum CES welfare allocation. The price curves take the very simple form of
fj(x) = qjx
1−ρ for constants q1, . . . , qm that are derived from the dual.
Theorem 6.1. If wij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , then for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), any
maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves.
Proof. We begin by writing the following program to maximize CES welfare:
max
x∈Rn×m
≥0
,
u=(u1...un)∈Rn≥0
(∑
i∈N
uρi
)1/ρ
s.t. ui ≤
xij
wij
∀i ∈ N, j ∈M where wij 6= 0∑
i∈N
xij ≤ sj ∀j ∈M
The objective
(∑
i∈N u
ρ
i
)1/ρ
is concave for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), so the resulting program is
convex. For brevity, we will omit “where wij 6= 0” for the rest of the proof, and assume that any
terms which could cause division by zero are simply omitted.
We can remove the exponent of 1/ρ from the objective without affecting the optimal point: the
optimal value may be affected, but the optimal solution (i.e., the argmax) will not. When ρ is
negative, this changes the program to a minimization program, but this can be handled by adding
a factor of 1/ρ to the objective.19 Thus consider a new convex program with objective function
max
x∈Rn×m
≥0
,u∈Rn
≥0
1
ρ
∑
i∈N u
ρ
i , and the same constraints.
Next, we write the Lagrangian of the new program. Let λij be the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the constraint ui ≤
xij
wij
and let qj be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
19We add a factor of 1/ρ instead of ρ because this will slightly simplify the analysis.
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∑
i∈N xij ≤ sj. We will use λ and q to denote the vectors of all such Lagrange multipliers. Then
the Lagrangian is given by
L(x,u,λ,q) =
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
uρi −
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
λij
(
ui −
xij
wij
)
−
∑
j∈M
qj
(∑
i∈N
xij − sj
)
Consider any maximum CES welfare allocation: this corresponds to a point (x∗,u∗) which is
optimal for the primal. We have strong duality by Slater’s condition, so there must exist λ∗ and
q∗ such that (x∗,u∗,λ∗,q∗) is optimal for L.
Since the primal objective was concave, L is concave in x and u, so the gradient of L evaluated
at (x∗,u∗,λ∗,q∗) must be zero. In particular, ∂L∂ui (x
∗,u∗,λ∗,q∗) = u∗i
ρ−1−
∑
j∈M λ
∗
ij = 0 for every
i ∈ N . Since ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), we have ρ− 1 6= 0, so u∗i = (
∑
j∈M λ
∗
ij)
1
ρ−1 .
Similarly, ∂L∂xij (x
∗,u∗,λ∗,q∗) =
λ∗ij
wij
− q∗j = 0 for every i ∈ N and j ∈ M , and so λ
∗
ij = q
∗
jwij .
This implies that u∗i =
(∑
j∈M q
∗
jwij
) 1
ρ−1 . Then by the definition of Leontief utility, we have
x∗ij = wiju
∗
i = wij
(∑
j∈M
q∗jwij
) 1
ρ−1
We now use the Lagrange multipliers q∗ to construct explicit price curves. We define fj(x) by
fj(x) = q
∗
jx
1−ρ. Since ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), we have 1 − ρ > 0, so these price curves are in fact
increasing. We claim that (x∗, f) is a price curve equilibrium. To see this, we explicit compute the
cost of agent i’s bundle x∗i :
Cf (x
∗
i ) =
∑
ℓ∈M
fℓ(x
∗
iℓ) =
∑
ℓ∈M
q∗ℓw
1−ρ
iℓ
(∑
j∈M
q∗jwij
) 1−ρ
ρ−1
=
∑
ℓ∈M
q∗ℓw
1−ρ
iℓ∑
j∈M
q∗jwij
The crucial use of wiℓ ∈ {0, 1} is that w
1−ρ
iℓ = wiℓ. Therefore Cf (x
∗
i ) =
∑
ℓ∈M
q∗ℓwiℓ∑
j∈M
q∗jwij
= 1.
Thus x∗i is affordable to agent i. Furthermore, since these price curves are strictly increasing,
no bundle with higher utility is affordable to agent i, so x∗i is in agent i’s demand set. We also
know that
∑
j∈M x
∗
ij ≤ 1, since x
∗ is a feasible solution to the primal. Therefore (x∗, f) is a price
curve equilibrium.
The structure of the price curve themselves (fj(x) = q
∗
jx
1−ρ) is also interesting when we consider
the interpretation of the parameter ρ: the smaller ρ is, the more we care about agents with small
utility. Recall that taking of ρ → −∞ yields max-min welfare, where we only care about the
minimum utility. When ρ = 1, we have utilitarian welfare, where we only care about overall
efficiency. This roughly corresponds to caring more about agents with higher utility. The limit as
ρ → 0 corresponds to Nash welfare, which is a mix of caring about both agents with low utility
and those with high utility.
We know that maximum Nash welfare allocations are supported by linear price curves, i.e.,
those with constant marginal prices. When ρ < 0, these marginal prices are increasing, making
it easier for agents who are buying less of each good. Since wij ∈ {0, 1}, ui(xi) = xij whenever
wij 6= 0, so the agents who are buying less are also the ones with lower utility. Thus price curves
of this form for ρ < 0 are benefiting the agents with low utility. Furthermore, the smaller ρ is, the
faster marginal prices grow, which corresponds to favoring agents with low utility even more. On
the other hand, when ρ > 0, these marginal prices are decreasing. This favors agents with higher
utility, which is consistent with the interpretation of the CES welfare function with ρ > 0.
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6.1 A converse to Theorem 6.1
In this section, we prove a converse of sorts to Theorem 6.1: if an allocation x can be supported by
price curves f of the form fj(x) = q
∗
jx
1−ρ, and the supply is exhausted for any good with nonzero
price, then x must be a maximum CES welfare allocation. The requirement that the supply be
exhausted for any good with nonzero price (i.e.,
∑
i∈N xij = sj whenever qj 6= 0) is analogous to
the second condition in definition of Fisher market (i.e., standard linear pricing) equilibrium given
in Section 3.1.
The proof of Theorem 6.2 essentially hinges on the fact that when strong duality holds, the
KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality. This is analogous to the proof of Theorem 6.1, which
is based on the fact that the KKT conditions are necessary for optimality.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose (x∗, f) is a price curve equilibrium where for all j ∈ M , fj(x) = q
∗
jx
1−ρ
for ρ ∈ (−∞, 1) and nonnegative constants q∗1 . . . q
∗
m. If
∑
i∈N x
∗
ij = sj whenever qj 6= 0, then x
∗ is
a maximum CES welfare allocation.
Proof. First, for Nash welfare (ρ = 0), this is exactly Eisenberg and Gale’s result: the linear-pricing
equilibrium allocations are exactly the allocations maximizing Nash welfare [10, 11]. Thus for the
rest of this proof, we assume ρ 6= 0.
The proof follows a duality argument very similar to the proof of Theorem 6.1. We use the same
convex program for maximizing CES welfare, which, as stated in the proof of Theorem 6.1, satisfies
strong duality. Suppose (x∗,g) is a PCE, where gj(x) = q
∗
jx
1−ρ for all j ∈ M for nonnegative
constants q∗1 . . . q
∗
m. Let u
∗
i = ui(x
∗
i ) be agent i’s utility for x
∗, and let λ∗ij = q
∗
jwij . Let u
∗ =
u∗1 . . . u
∗
n, let q
∗ = q∗1 . . . q
∗
m, and let λ
∗ represent the vector of all λ∗ij’s.
Since our convex program satisfies strong duality, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
are both necessary and sufficient for optimality. Specifically, if we can show that (x∗,u∗,λ∗,q∗)
satisfies the KKT conditions, then (x∗,u∗) is optimal for the primal. The KKT conditions are
primal feasibility, dual feasibility, complementary slackness, and stationarity. Since x∗ is a valid
allocation and u∗i is defined by u
∗
i = ui(x
∗
i ) for all i ∈ N , primal feasibility of (x
∗,u∗) immediately
follows. Since q∗j ≥ 0 for all j ∈M by assumption and λ
∗
ij ≥ 0 by definition, we have dual feasibility
as well.
Complementary slackness requires that for every constraint, either the constraint is tight, or
the corresponding dual variable is equal to 0. For the supply constraints, we need to show that for
all j ∈M , we have
∑
j∈M x
∗
ij = sj whenever q
∗
j = 0. This is satisfied by assumption. For the other
constraints, we need to show that for all i, j, either λ∗ij = 0 or x
∗
ij = wiju
∗
i . Since λ
∗
ij = q
∗
jwij, we
have λ∗ij = 0 when q
∗
j = 0. Suppose q
∗
j 6= 0 and x
∗
ij 6= wiju
∗
i : then we must have x
∗
ij > wiju
∗
i , since
q∗j 6= 0, agent i must be spending money of good j; furthermore, she is purchasing more of good j
than she needs. Instead, she could purchase x′ij = wiju
∗
i and have some leftover money, which she
could use to buy slightly more of every good and increase her utility. This would imply that x∗i is
not in agent i’s demand set, which contradicts (x∗, f) being a price curve equilibrium. Therefore
we have x∗ij = wiju
∗
i whenever qj 6= 0, which satisfies the complementary slackness conditions.
For stationarity, we need to show that the gradient of L with respect to x and u vanishes at
(x∗,u∗,λ∗,q∗). Specifically, we need to show that
∂L
∂ui
(x∗,u∗,λ∗,q∗) = u∗i
ρ−1−
∑
j∈M λ
∗
ij = 0, and
∂L
∂xij
(x∗,u∗,λ∗,q∗) =
λ∗ij
wij
− q∗j = 0. The latter follows immediately from the definition of λ
∗
ij, so it
remains to show the former.
Since (x∗, f) is a price curve equilibrium, each agent must be exhausting her entire budget.
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Thus Cf (x
∗
i ) = 1 for all i ∈ N , which gives us:
Cf (x
∗
i ) =
∑
j∈M
fj(x
∗
ij) =
∑
j∈M
q∗jx
∗
ij
1−ρ = 1
Furthermore, as argued above, we have x∗ij = wiju
∗
i whenever qj 6= 0. Therefore∑
j∈M
q∗jx
∗
ij
1−ρ =
∑
j:q∗j 6=0
q∗jx
∗
ij
1−ρ
=
∑
j:q∗j 6=0
q∗j (wiju
∗
i )
1−ρ
= u∗i
1−ρ
∑
j:q∗j 6=0
q∗jw
1−ρ
ij
= u∗i
1−ρ
∑
j:q∗j 6=0
q∗jwij
where the last equality is because wij ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore we have
u∗i
1−ρ
∑
j:q∗j 6=0
q∗jwij = 1
∑
j:q∗j 6=0
q∗jwij = u
∗
i
ρ−1
u∗i
ρ−1 −
∑
j:q∗j 6=0
q∗jwij = 0
u∗i
ρ−1 −
∑
j∈M
q∗jwij = 0
u∗i
ρ−1 −
∑
j∈M
λ∗ij = 0
Therefore
∂L
∂ui
(x∗,u∗,λ∗,q∗) = u∗i
ρ−1 −
∑
j∈M λ
∗
ij is indeed 0. Thus the KKT conditions are
satisfied. Therefore (x∗,u∗,λ∗,q∗) is optimal for L, which implies that (x∗,u∗) is optimal for the
primal: in other words, x∗ is a maximum CES welfare allocation.
6.2 Unequal budgets
Finally, we address the setting where agents may have different amounts of money to spend. Let
Bi be agent i’s budget. If we instead consider the budget-weighted CES welfare
ΦCES(x) =
(∑
i∈N
Biui(xi)
ρ
)1/ρ
then the above argument extends directly. Duality tells us that agent i’s utility must be
ui(xi) =
( 1
Bi
∑
j∈M
q∗jwij
) 1
ρ−1
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and by using the same price curves of fj(x) = q
∗
jx
1−ρ, we get Cf (xi) =
∑
ℓ∈M
Biq
∗
ℓw
1−ρ
iℓ∑
j∈M
q∗jwij
= Bi, so
agent i is indeed spending exactly her budget.
A social planner may prefer to give the same weight to each agent’s utility, even if the budgets
are not the same. Unfortunately, allocations with optimal unweighted CES welfare cannot be
supported (at least not exactly) when agents have different budgets. To see this, consider two
agents with different budgets and a single good: whichever agent has more money must receive a
larger portion of the good. But assuming the agents have the same weight for that good (which
holds in the bandwidth allocation setting or when weights are normalized somehow), the unweighted
CES welfare optimum would give each agent the same amount. This is analogous to the Fisher
market setting: the Fisher market equilibria for unequal budgets are exactly the allocations which
maximize the budget-weighted Nash welfare.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed price curves in several different settings, focusing on agents with Leontief
utilities. Our first main result was that for strictly increasing price curves, an allocation can be
supported if and only if it is GDF. We proved this by defining the agent-order matrix, and using
duality theorems to show the existence of a strongly positive solution to a particular system of linear
equations. Our second main result was that in the bandwidth allocation setting, the maximum CES
welfare allocation can be supported by price curves. These price curves took the simple form of
fj(x) = qjx
1−ρ. This is contrast to the standard linear pricing setting, where only maximum Nash
welfare allocations can be equilibria.
There are many possible directions for future research. The first is the possibility of taˆtonnement
for price curves. A taˆtonnement process iteratively computes an equilibrium allocation by asking
agents for their demand given a set of prices, and then updates prices accordingly (typically by
raising the price of goods whose demand exceeds supply and lowering the price of goods whose
demand is less than the supply). These processes have been well-studied for linear prices. One
approach makes use of the fact that the equilibrium prices are the dual variables in the convex
program to maximize Nash welfare, and gives a taˆtonnement process that is akin to gradient
descent on the dual program. We think that this approach could also yield taˆtonnement for price
curves, in particular for maximum CES welfare allocations in bandwidth allocation. This is because
q1, . . . , qm are exactly the dual variables of the convex program for maximizing CES welfare, just as
linear prices are the dual variables of the convex program for maximizing Nash welfare. We think
this deserves further study.
A second possible direction is studying price curves for other classes of agent utilities, and
in particular, linear utilities. We will discuss in Appendix C some of the challenges that linear
utilities pose for analyzing price curves, but perhaps everything would fall into place with the right
framework.
Third, future research could consider in more depth the setting of price curves with unequal
budgets. Our results did extend to this setting in the sense of budget-weighted group-domination
and budget-weighted CES welfare, but weighting agents’ utilities by the amount of money they
have seems inappropriate for many contexts.
Last but not least, we are intrigued by the connection between GDF and the agent-order matrix
and duality theorems, and we wonder if this connection could be useful for other resource allocation
problems as well.
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A Characterization of allocations supported by weakly increasing
price curves
In Section 4, we showed that an allocation can be supported with strictly increasing price curves if
and only it is GDF. In this section, we provide the analogous necessary and sufficient condition for
the case where any (continuous, weakly increasing) price curves are permitted. This boils down to
what we called locked-agent-freeness (LAF). LAF is not a particularly interesting condition on its
own – though as with GDF it implies a polynomial time algorithm for finding price curves – but it
is crucial in allowing us to prove that maximum CES welfare allocations can be supported.
For an allocation x, we wish to determine whether there exist price curves f such that (x, f)
is a price curve equilibrium. Assuming x obeys the supply constraints, we just need to determine
whether there exist price curves f such that xi ∈ Di(f) for all i ∈ N .
Recall that a ≻ b if for all j ∈M and τ ∈ R≥0,
∑
i∈N :xij≥τ
(ai−bi) ≥ 0, and there exists a (j, τ)
pair such that the inequality is strict. As discussed in Section 4, this implies that the aggregate
spending of a is at least that of b for any f , i.e.,∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)Cf (xi) ≥ 0
for any price curves f . Furthermore, we argued that for strictly increasing f , the inequality is strict,
so b cannot be made to pay as much as a. When we allow weakly increasing price curves, a ≻ b
simply implies that, for any marginal price where a would have to pay strictly more than b, that
marginal price must be zero.
We still need to ensure that xi ∈ Di(f) ∀i ∈ N , i.e., that every agent spends her full budget and
cannot get more utility for free (Lemma 4.1). This requirement can be expressed by locked-agent-
freeness.
Definition A.1 (Locked-agent-free (LAF)). For simplicity, we define two meanings of “locked”:
• Agent i is locked in an allocation x if there exists a domination a ≻ b such that for all j ∈M
where xij > 0, and all sufficiently small ε > 0, a ≻ b is strict at (j, xij + ε).
• The allocation is locked if there exists a ≻ b which is strict at every (j, τ) for τ ∈ (0,maxi xij ].
If nothing is locked in allocation x, we say that x is locked-agent-free (LAF).
Intuitively, an agent being locked implies that the cost to increase her allocation must be
zero, which will violate condition (b) of Lemma 4.1. The allocation being locked implies that all
marginal prices must be zero, and thus all price curves must be identically zero. Clearly, any non-
LAF allocation cannot be supported by price curves. Perhaps surprisingly, the opposite directly
holds as well, as stated by Theorem A.2.
The proof of Theorem A.2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3 for strictly increasing price
curves. The main difference is that strictly increasing price curves trivially satisfy condition (b) of
Lemma 4.1, preventing any agent from getting more utility for free. For weakly increasing price
curves, however, we need to add a constraint specifically to ensure that condition is satisfied. Thus
in addition to the agent-order matrix, we will define a marginal-cost matrix to ensure that no agent
has a marginal cost of zero to increase her utility. In order to incorporate this matrix, we use a
more general duality result than Lemma 4.2 (although still equivalent to Farkas’s Lemma [22]),
this one due to Motzkin. Recall that v > 0 denotes a strictly positive vector, and v ≫ 0 strongly
positive.
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

1 1 1 0 1 0 -1

1 1 0 0 0 0 -11 0 0 1 1 1 -1
0 0 0 0 1 1 -1
(a) x represented as a agent-order matrix A


1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 0 1 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(b) the corresponding marginal-cost matrix C
Figure 3: Example construction of the marginal-cost matrix from an agent-order matrix.
Lemma A.1 (1.6.1 in [29]). For matrices A,B,C over R, the following are equivalent.
1. Ay = 0, By ≥ 0, Cy≫ 0 has no solution
2. ATu+BTv + CTw = 0,v ≥ 0,w > 0 has a solution
Theorem A.2. Let x be an allocation which obeys the supply constraints and gives a nonempty
bundle to at least one agent. Then x can be supported by weakly increasing price curves if and only
if it is LAF.
Proof. Recall that an allocation x is supported by price curves f if xi ∈ Di(f) ∀i ∈ N , and∑
i∈N xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ M . The latter condition is satisfied by assumption, and by Lemma 4.1, for
Leontief utilities, the former condition holds if and only if the cost Cf (xi) = 1 and there exists
j ∈M such that ∀ε > 0 fj(xij + εwij) > fj(xij).
As before, let Xj = {xij | i ∈ N} \ {0} be the set of distinct, non-zero amounts of good j
allocated to some agent under x. Label these elements such that τ1j < τ
2
j < · · · < τ
|Xj |
j . Since
fj(0) = 0, fj(x /∈ Xj) in some sense doesn’t matter – we only require that these “in-between” areas
of the price curve are weakly increasing and don’t violate continuity. Thus there exist price curves
f supporting x if and only if there exist functions f ′j : Xj → R≥0 such that
1. for all j ∈M , 0 ≤ f ′j(τ
1
j ) ≤ f
′
j(τ
2
j ) ≤ · · · ≤ f
′
j(τ
|Xj |
j ) (weakly increasing)
2. for all i ∈ N , Cf (xi) =
∑
j f
′
j(xij) = 1 (total cost 1)
3. for all i ∈ N , exists r, j ∈M such that f ′j(τ
r
j = xij 6= 0) < f
′
j(τ
r+1
j ) (positive marginal cost)
Now we are ready to set up the matrices A,B,C (all of width
∑
j |Xj | + 1) to which we will
apply Lemma A.1. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, A will be the agent-order matrix, and the
solution vector y will represent the marginal prices, with the last entry representing the total cost
per agent. Thus, define
A

i, ∑
ℓ<j
|Xℓ|+ q

 =


−1 if j = m+ 1, q = 1 (last column)
0 if xij < τ
q
j
1 otherwise
Furthermore, let B be the square identity matrix I; this will ensure that the prices are weakly
increasing. Finally, we need to define the marginal-cost matrix C. As shown in Figure 3, we can
create C based only on A: If agent i receives the largest amount of some good (row i has a 1 in
the last column of some sub-block), then agent i’s row in C is all 1’s. Intuitively, we can set the
price above maxi xij arbitrarily to ensure i has positive marginal cost, so it should be trivial to
satisfy Ciy > 0. Otherwise, agent i’s row is all zeros, except that within a sub-block if there is a
1 followed by a 0 in row i in A, the position of that 0 becomes a 1 in C. Intuitively, these are the
places i would have to buy more of a good to increase her utility. Formally, define
C

i, ∑
ℓ<j
|Xℓ|+ q

 =


1 if ∃j′ A
[
i,
∑
ℓ≤j′ |Xℓ|
]
= 1
1 if q ≥ 1, A
[
i,
∑
ℓ<j |Xℓ|+ q
]
= 0, A
[
i,
∑
ℓ<j |Xℓ|+ q − 1
]
= 1
0 otherwise
Since x gives at least one agent a nonempty bundle by assumption, A,B,C have at least two
columns. We know by Lemma A.1 that ∃y such that Ay = 0, By ≥ 0, Cy ≫ 0 if and only if
6 ∃u,v,w such that ATu + BTv + CTw = 0,v ≥ 0,w > 0. To complete the proof, we will show
that the former condition is equivalent to the existence of weakly increasing price curves supporting
x, and the latter is equivalent to either x or an agent i being locked.
Define f ′j(τ
q
j )−f
′
j(τ
q−1
j ) = y
∑
ℓ<j |Xℓ|+q
, where for convenience we let f ′j(τ
0
j ) = f
′
j(0) = 0. Clearly
By = y ≥ 0 is equivalent to the requirement that price curves be weakly increasing. Furthermore,
note that Cy≫ 0 implies y > 0, so without loss of generality we can assume the last entry of y is
1. Thus as before, Ay = 0 is equivalent to the requirement that every agent’s total cost equals 1.
Revisiting Cy ≫ 0, since y > 0 this is trivially satisfied for every row where agent i receives the
largest amount of some good – equivalently, agent i’s marginal cost can trivially be made positive.
Additionally, for all other agents, Ciy > 0 is by definition equivalent to having positive marginal
cost. Thus a solution vector y is equivalent to weakly increasing price curves supporting x.
If no such solution exists, then we have ATu + BTv + CTw = 0,v ≥ 0,w > 0. Rearranging,
and since B = I, this is equivalent to ATu ≥ CTw,w > 0. Without loss of generality, assume
w is only non-zero on entry i. Furthermore, for all k define ak = uk if uk > 0 and bk = −uk if
uk < 0. Then A
Tu ≥ CTw is equivalent to a ≻ b such that the domination is strict wherever Ci is
non-zero. If Ci = 1, this is equivalent to allocation x being locked. Otherwise, this is equivalent to
agent i being locked. Thus ATu ≥ CTw,w > 0 is equivalent to something being locked in x.
Finally, we observe that LAF give us the following linear program, which computes price curves
(or shows that none exist) in polynomial time.
Theorem A.3. Given a set of agents N , goods M , and an allocation x ∈ Rn×m≥0 , let A be the
corresponding agent-order matrix and C the marginal-cost matrix. In the following linear program,
the optimal objective value is strictly positive if and only if there exist strictly increasing price curves
supporting x, in which case y defines such curves.
max
y,η
η
s.t. Ay = 0
yk ≥ 0 ∀k
Ciy ≥ η ∀i
y−1 = 1
Proof. As per the proof of Theorem A.2, there exist strictly increasing price curves supporting x
if and only if there is a solution to the system Ay = 0,y ≥ 0, Cy ≫ 0. To turn this into a valid
linear program, we replace the strict inequality Ciy > 0 with Ciy ≥ η and attempt to maximize η.
Furthermore, we restrict the final entry of y as y−1 = 1, since otherwise y can be scaled arbitrarily.
If there is a solution with η > 0, then y corresponds to price curves as before, with each entry
representing the difference in price between adjacent allocation amounts. These points simply need
to be connected, e.g., in a piecewise linear fashion, to constitute valid price curves.
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B Other results for CES welfare
In Section 6, we showed that in the bandwidth setting, the maximum CES welfare allocations can
be supported by price curves (Theorem 6.1). We proved this by using duality to construct explicit
price curves of the form fj(x) = qjx
1−ρ.
This section presents additional results for CES welfare. In Section B.1, we give an alternative
proof of Theorem 6.1 which uses the group domination approach from Section 4 and Appendix A.
Section B.2 considers two other settings where the maximum CES welfare allocations be can
supported for any ρ < 0: (1) when there are two agents and the agents’ weights obey any reasonable
norm, and (2) for any number of agents, when the agents’ weights are normalized with respect to
ρ.
B.1 An alternative proof for the bandwidth case using group domination
This section presents an alternative proof of Theorem 6.1 using the group domination notions.
It turns out that there exist instances where the maximum CES welfare allocations cannot be
supported by strictly increasing price curves, but can be supported by weakly increasing price
curves (Example 2). Thus the GDF characterization theorem from Section 4 will not be sufficient,
and we will have to use the slightly more unwieldy LAF characterization theorem from Appendix A.
The proof considers an arbitrary, locked or locked-agent allocation x, and constructs special
vectors a,b that satisfy a stronger version of a ≻ b. We show that by taking a fraction of a’s
allocation and giving it to b, we can construct a new allocation with strictly higher CES welfare.
This shows that any maximum CES allocation must be LAF, and hence can be supported by price
curves by Theorem A.2. However, constructing this new allocation and proving that it has better
CES welfare is quite technically involved, with a surprise cameo from L’Hoˆpital’s rule.
Although the duality proof from Section 6 holds for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), the proof given
in this section actually only holds for ρ ∈ (−∞, 0). There is a footnote marking the exact point
where this proof breaks down for ρ > 0.
We now define a stronger version of group domination that will relate usefully to LAF. Let
Mi = {j ∈M : wij > 0} be the set of goods that agent i cares about.
Definition B.1 (Strong group domination). Let a and b be vectors in Rn≥0 where
∑
k∈N ak =∑
k∈N bk. Then a strongly group-dominates b with respect to agent i in an allocation x (denoted
a ≻≻i b) if a ≻ b, and for all j ∈Mi, there exists τ ∈ R≥0 such that∑
k∈N : xkj≥τ
(ak − bk) > 0
Normal group domination would only require that there exist a single (j, τ) pair where this
inequality is strict; a ≻≻i b requires that there exists such a τ for every good j that agent i
cares about. Just like for normal group domination, we can assume without loss of generality
that when a ≻≻i b, min(ak, bk) = 0 for all k ∈ N : were this not the case, we could simply set
a′k = ak −min(ak, bk) and b
′
k = bk −min(ak, bk) for all k ∈ N and have a
′ ≻≻i b
′.
The following lemma states how this relates to LAF.
Lemma B.1. Suppose allocation x is locked, or has a locked agent i. Then there exist a,b ∈ Rn≥0
such that a ≻≻i b.
Proof. By definition, if agent i is locked, there exists a ≻ b which is strict at (j, xij + ε) for all
j ∈Mi and sufficiently small ε > 0. Clearly this implies a ≻≻i b.
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If the allocation itself is locked, then there exists a ≻ b which is strict at (j, τ) for every
τ ∈ (0,maxi xij]. Thus a ≻ b is strict on every good that any agent cares about, so a ≻≻i b for
every agent i.
Lemma B.2. Let v = (v1 . . . vd),y = (y1 . . . yd), and z = (z1 . . . zd) be vectors in R
d
≥0 such that∑
i∈{1...d} yi =
∑
i∈{1...d} zi, and for every τ ∈ R≥0,
∑
i∈{1...d}:vi≥τ
(yi−zi) ≥ 0. Then for any weakly
decreasing function g : R≥0 → R≥0, ∑
i∈{1...d}
(yi − zi)g(vi) ≤ 0
If g is strictly decreasing on [0,max(v) + 2], and ∃τ
∑
i∈{1...d}:vi≥τ
(yi − zi) > 0, then the above
inequality is strict.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that v1 ≤ v2 ≤ · · · ≤ vd ≤ vd+1 = vd + 1. Observe that∑
i:vi<τ
(yi − zi) =
∑
i∈{1...d}
(yi − zi)−
∑
i:vi≥τ
(yi − zi) ≤ 0 (1)
for every τ . We will prove by induction on k that
∑
i:vi<vk
(yi − zi)g(vi) ≤
∑
i:vi<vk
(yi − zi)g(vk).
In the base case, k = 1 so the sums are vacuous and both equal 0. For the inductive case, assume
the statement holds for k − 1. Then,∑
i:vi<vk
(yi − zi)g(vi) =
∑
i:vk−1≤vi<vk
(yi − zi)g(vi) +
∑
i:vi<vk−1
(yi − zi)g(vi)
≤
∑
i:vk−1≤vi<vk
(yi − zi)g(vk−1) +
∑
i:vi<vk−1
(yi − zi)g(vk−1)
=
∑
i:vi<vk
(yi − zi)g(vk−1) ≤
∑
i:vi<vk
(yi − zi)g(vk)
using the inductive hypothesis, equation (1), and g(·) ≥ 0. Finally, plugging in k = d+1, we obtain∑
i∈{1...d}
(yi − zi)g(vi) =
∑
i:vi<vd+1
(yi − zi)g(vi) ≤
∑
i:vi<vd+1
(yi − zi)g(vd+1) ≤ 0
again by equation (1) and g(·) ≥ 0.
Finally, note that if g is strictly decreasing and ∃τ
∑
i∈{1...d}:vi≥τ
(yi − zi) > 0, then at the
inductive step where vk−1 < τ ≤ vk, the inequality becomes strict and is propagated upwards to
k = d+ 1.
Lemma B.3. Suppose a ≻≻i b for some agent i in allocation x. Then for any strictly increasing
function g : R≥0 → R≥0, for all j ∈M ,∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)g(xij) ≥ 0
Furthermore, the inequality is strict for all j ∈Mi.
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Proof. Let v = (x1j . . . xnj),y = a, and z = b. Since a ≻≻i b, we have
∑
i ai =
∑
i bi and∑
i:xij≥τ
(ai − bi) ≥ 0 for all τ ∈ R≥0. If j ∈ Mi, there exists τ for which this inequality is strict.
Finally, define the strictly decreasing (on [0,max(v) + 2]) function
g˜(x) =
{
g(max(v) + 2)− g(x) if x ∈ [0,max(v) + 2]
0 otherwise
Then by Lemma B.2,∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)g(xij) =
∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)g(max(v) + 2)−
∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)g˜(xij) ≥ 0
and the inequality is strict if j ∈Mi.
One useful case of Lemma B.3 is when g is the identity function, in which case the lemma
implies that the aggregate allocation of a is more than the aggregate allocation of b.
Lemma B.4. Suppose a ≻≻i b for some agent i in allocation x. Then for any strictly decreasing
function g : R≥0 → R≥0, for all j ∈M ,∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)g(xij) ≤ 0
Furthermore, the inequality is strict for all j ∈Mi.
Proof. Let v = (x1j . . . xnj),y = a, and z = b. Since a ≻≻i b, we have
∑
i ai =
∑
i bi and∑
i:xij≥τ
(ai − bi) ≥ 0 for all τ ∈ R≥0. If j ∈ Mi, there exists τ for which this inequality is strict.
Lemma B.2 then gives the desired result.
We are now ready to move on to the main lemma (Lemma B.6). Recall L’Hoˆpital’s rule:
Lemma B.5 (L’Hoˆpital’s Rule). Let g1 : R→ R and g2 : R→ R be functions, and let I ⊂ R be
an open interval containing point c. Suppose all of the following hold:
1. Both g1 and g2 are differentiable at all points in I except possibly c. Let g
′
1 and g
′
2 denote
their derivatives.
2. g′2(x) 6= 0 for all x ∈ I\{c}.
3. Either lim
x→c
g1(x) = lim
x→c
g2(x) = 0, or both of those limits diverge.
4. The limit lim
x→c
g′1(x)
g′2(x)
exists.
Then lim
x→c
g1(x)
g2(x)
exists, and
lim
x→c
g1(x)
g2(x)
= lim
x→c
g′1(x)
g′2(x)
Lemma B.6 uses a technically involved argument with L’Hoˆpital’s rule playing a crucial role to
show that we can indeed improve the CES welfare of any allocation x where a ≻≻k b, as long as∑
i∈N (ai − bi)ui(xi)
ρ ≤ 0. Since ρ < 0, this is saying that agents in a overall have more utility
(exponentially weighted by ρ) than agents in b, which we might expect since a ≻ b. The proof of
the main theorem involves showing that
∑
i∈N (ai− bi)ui(xi)
ρ > 0 is impossible, and then applying
Lemma B.6. The assumption that wij ∈ {0, 1} is only used in the final theorem; Lemma B.6 does
not require it. This is important, as we will also use Lemma B.6 in other settings (Section B.2).
The proof of Lemma B.6 involves several steps:
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1. Given a vectors a,b and an agent k where a ≻≻k b in allocation x, we will define a new
allocation x′ where we take a fraction of the bundles of agents in a and distribute it among
agents in b, giving a little bit extra to agent k (who may or may not be part of a or b).
Specifically, we let x′ij = (1 − δai + δbi)xij for i 6= k, and x
′
kj = (1 − δak + δbk + ε)xkj for
some ε > 0. Lemma B.3 implies that
∑
i∈N (ai − bi)xij > 0 for all j ∈M , and thus for small
enough ε > 0, x′ still obeys the supply constraints.
2. We wish to show that this change improves the CES welfare of the agents in b and agent k
more than it hurts the CES welfare of agents in a. We will show that this reduces to proving
that a particular complicated fraction, which depends on δ, is greater than a value β < 1.
3. We will use L’Hoˆpital’s Rule to show that the limit of this fraction as δ goes to 0 is at least
1, as long as
∑
i∈N (ai − bi)ui(xi)
ρ ≥ 0.
4. This will imply that as long as δ is small enough, this fraction will be strictly larger than
β, and our new allocation x′ has better CES welfare than x. Thus x cannot be a maximum
CES welfare allocation.
Lemma B.6. Suppose there exists a,b ∈ Rn≥0 and k ∈ N such that a ≻≻k b in allocation x,∑
i∈N (ai − bi)ui(xi)
ρ ≤ 0, and ρ < 0. Then x is not a maximum CES welfare allocation.
Proof. Step 1: We reserve the variable k for referring to the specific agent k where a ≻≻k b. Note
that k could be part of a or b, or neither. Recall that Mk is the set of goods that agent k cares
about. Since a ≻≻k b, Lemma B.3 implies that
∑
i∈N (ai − bi)xij > 0 for all j ∈Mk. Define ε by
ε = min
j∈Mk
∑
i∈N (ai − bi)xij
xkj
Thus ε > 0, and for all j ∈ Mk, ε ≤
∑
i∈N (ai−bi)xij
xkj
. Therefore
∑
i∈N (ai − bi)xij ≥ εxkj for all
j ∈Mk.
For some small δ > 0 to be chosen later, we define a new allocation x′ by
x′ij =
{
(1− δai + δbi)xij if i 6= k
(1− δak + δbk + δε)xkj if i = k
We will make sure that δ is small enough that (1 − δai + δbi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N : otherwise this
would not be a valid allocation.
We first show that x′ still obeys the supply constraints, i.e.,
∑
i∈N x
′
ij ≤
∑
i∈N xij ≤ sj for all
j ∈M . For all j ∈M , we have∑
i∈N
xij −
∑
i∈N
x′ij =
∑
i∈N
xij −
∑
i 6=k
(1− δai + δbi)xij − (1− δak + δbk + δε)xkj
=
∑
i∈N
xij −
∑
i∈N
xij − δ
∑
i∈N
(−ai + bi)xij − δεxkj
= δ
∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)xij − δεxkj
≥ δεxkj − δεxkj = 0
Thus x′ is a valid allocation.
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Step 2: We wish to show that ΦCES(x
′) > ΦCES(x). For brevity, we write ui = ui(xi) and
u′i = ui(x
′
i). We want to prove that
ΦCES(x
′)− ΦCES(x) =
(∑
i∈N
u′ρi
)1/ρ
−
(∑
i∈N
uρi
)1/ρ
> 0
Since ρ < 0, this is equivalent to showing that
∑
i∈N u
ρ
i −
∑
i∈N u
′ρ
i > 0.
20
For each agent i 6= k, x′ changes her bundle by a factor of (1−δai+δbi), so u
′
i = (1−δai+δbi)ui
for all i 6= k. Similarly, u′k = (1−δai+δbi+δε)uk. Furthermore, since we assume that min(ai, bi) = 0
in the definition of a ≻≻k b, we have u
′
i = (1− δai)ui for all i 6= k with ai > 0, and u
′
i = (1+ δbi)ui
for all i 6= k with bi > 0.
If agent k did not get the boost from the extra δε, her new utility would be (1− δak + δbk)uk.
Let α = u′ρk − (1 − δak + δbk)
ρuρk be the extra (exponentially weighted in ρ < 0) utility agent k
receives from the δε. Since u′k > (1− δak + δbk)uk and ρ < 0, we have α < 0.
For all agents i 6= k where ai = bi = 0, we have ui = u
′
i. Therefore∑
i∈N
uρi −
∑
i∈N
u′ρi = u
ρ
k − u
′ρ
k +
∑
i 6=k:ai>0
(uρi − u
′ρ
i ) +
∑
i 6=k:bi>0
(uρi − u
′ρ
i ) +
∑
i:ai=bi=0
(uρi − u
′ρ
i )
= uρk − u
′ρ
k +
∑
i 6=k:ai>0
(uρi − u
′ρ
i ) +
∑
i 6=k:bi>0
(uρi − u
′ρ
i )
= uρk − u
′ρ
k +
∑
i 6=k:ai>0
[
uρi − (1− δai)
ρuρi
]
+
∑
i 6=k:bi>0
[
uρi − (1 + δbi)
ρuρi
]
= − α+
[
uρk − (1− δak + δbk)
ρuρk
]
+
∑
i 6=k:ai>0
[
1− (1− δai)
ρ
]
uρi +
∑
i 6=k:bi>0
[
1− (1 + δbi)
ρ
]
uρi
= − α+
∑
i∈N :ai>0
[
1− (1− δai)
ρ
]
uρi +
∑
i∈N :bi>0
[
1− (1 + δbi)
ρ
]
uρi
To summarize, we have shown that∑
i∈N
(uρi − u
′ρ
i ) = −α+
∑
i∈N :ai>0
[
1− (1− δai)
ρ
]
uρi +
∑
i∈N :bi>0
[
1− (1 + δbi)
ρ
]
uρi (2)
If we could show that the right hand side of equation (2) is strictly greater than 0, we would be
done, because then
∑
i∈N (u
ρ
i − u
′ρ
i ) > 0 and so ΦCES(x
′) − ΦCES(x) > 0. We will do this by
showing that
∑
i∈N :ai>0
[
1− (1− δai)
ρ
]
uρi +
∑
i∈N :bi>0
[
1− (1 + δbi)
ρ
]
uρi > α. Recall that α < 0.
Since ρ is negative and δ, ai, and bi are positive, we have
[
1−(1−δai)
ρ
]
< 0 and
[
1−(1+δbi)
ρ
]
>
0. Therefore it suffices to show that there exists a small δ > 0 such that
∑
i∈N :bi>0
[
1− (1 + δbi)
ρ
]
uρi
∑
i∈N :ai>0
[
(1− δai)ρ − 1
]
uρi
> 1 +
α∑
i∈N :ai>0
[
(1− δai)ρ − 1
]
uρi
(3)
Let β be the right hand side of this equation. The expression for β is complicated, but the important
thing is that since α < 0, and the denominator is positive, we have β < 1.
20This is where the proof breaks down for ρ > 0: we would instead have the inequality
∑
i∈N u
ρ
i −
∑
i∈N u
′ρ
i < 0,
which is incompatible with the rest of the proof.
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We will show that the limit of the left hand side of equation (3) is at least 1. This will imply
that we can pick δ to make the left hand side as close to 1 as we want: in particular, we can make
it larger than β.
Step 3: We use L’Hoˆpital’s Rule to compute the limit of this expression as δ goes to 0. Let
g1(δ) be the numerator of the above fraction, and let g2(δ) be the denominator.
Let us confirm that this limit satisfies the conditions of L’Hoˆpital’s Rule. Both g1(δ) and g2(δ)
are polynomials in δ and so differentiable everywhere they are defined. The derivatives are
∂g1
∂δ
(δ) =
∑
i∈N :bi>0
−ρbi(1 + δbi)
ρ−1uρi and
∂g2
∂δ
(δ) =
∑
i∈N :ai>0
−ρai(1− δai)
ρ−1uρi
The derivative of g2(δ) is never zero and g2 is only undefined at δ =
1
ai
, so we can easily pick
an open interval containing zero that does not contain that 1ai . This satisfies the first and second
conditions. We observe that limδ→0 g1(δ) = limδ→0 g2(δ) = 0, which satisfies the third condition.
Finally, we can explicit compute the following limit:
lim
δ→0
∂g1
∂δ
(δ)
∂g2
∂δ
(δ)
= lim
δ→0
∑
i∈N :bi>0
−ρbi(1 + δbi)
ρ−1uρi∑
i∈N :ai>0
−ρai(1− δai)ρ−1u
ρ
i
=
∑
i∈N :bi>0
bi(1 + 0)
ρ−1uρi∑
i∈N :ai>0
ai(1− 0)ρ−1u
ρ
i
=
∑
i∈N :bi>0
biu
ρ
i∑
i∈N :ai>0
aiu
ρ
i
=
∑
i∈N
biu
ρ
i∑
i∈N
aiu
ρ
i
≥ 1
where the final inequality follows from the assumption that
∑
i∈N (ai − bi)ui(xi)
ρ ≤ 0, which is
equivalent to
∑
i∈N biui(xi)
ρ ≥
∑
i∈N aiui(xi)
ρ. Therefore
lim
δ→0
∂g1
∂δ
(δ)
∂g2
∂δ
(δ)
≥ 1
Thus, by L’Hoˆpital’s Rule, we have
lim
δ→0
g1(δ)
g2(δ)
= lim
δ→0
∑
i∈N :bi>0
[
1− (1 + δbi)
ρ
]
uρi
∑
i∈N :ai>0
[
(1− δai)ρ − 1
]
uρi
≥ 1
Step 4: Now let us put everything together. The above limit implies that there exists δ
arbitrarily close to 0 such that the left hand side of equation (3) is arbitrarily close to 1. Since
β < 1, there exists δ so that the left hand side of equation (3) is strictly greater than β. Then∑
i∈N u
ρ
i −
∑
i∈N u
′ρ
i > 0, which in turn implies that ΦCES(x
′) − ΦCES(x) =
(∑
i∈N u
′ρ
i
)1/ρ
−(∑
i∈N u
ρ
i
)1/ρ
> 0.
Thus we have shown that if a ≻≻k b in an allocation x and
∑
i∈N (ai−bi)ui(xi)
ρ ≤ 0, there exists
another allocation x′ with strictly better CES welfare. This implies that x was not a maximum
CES welfare allocation, which completes the proof.
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We just need one more definition before proving the main theorem of this section. We say that
a ≻≻k b is minimal if there do not exist vectors a
′,b′ ∈ Rn≥0 and an agent k
′ ∈ N such that
a′ ≻≻k′ b
′, and such that strictly fewer agents have positive weight in a′ + b′. Formally, there
should not exist a′ ≻≻k′ b
′ such that |{i ∈ N : a′i + b
′
i > 0}| < |{i ∈ N : ai + bi > 0}|. Note that
if there exists any a,b, k such that a ≻≻k b, there must exist a minimal one, since minimality is
defined based on the number of agents involved, which can only take on integral values.
Theorem B.7 states that in the bandwidth allocation setting, any maximum CES welfare allo-
cation can be supported by price curves. The proof involves the following steps:
1. We use Theorem A.2 and Lemma B.1 to conclude that if a maximum CES welfare allocation
x cannot be supported by price curves, there must exist k ∈ N and a,b ∈ Rn≥0 such that
a ≻≻k b in x.
2. We then show that if
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
(ai − bi) ≥ 0 for all τ ∈ R≥0, then
∑
i∈N (ai − bi)ui(xi)
ρ ≤ 0. If
this were true, we could apply Lemma B.6 to show that x cannot be a maximum CES welfare
allocation, which is a contradiction.
3. Thus we will assume that there exists τ ∈ R≥0 such that
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
(ai − bi) < 0. We will use
this τ to construct new vectors a′,b′ that involve strictly fewer agents, and show that there
exists an agent k′ such that a′ ≻≻k′ b
′.
4. This will imply a ≻≻k b is not minimal. In fact, since we considered an arbitrary a ≻≻k b,
this will show that no a ≻≻k b is minimal. But we know that if there exists any strong group
domination, there must exist a minimal a ≻≻k b. This is a contradiction, so x can in fact be
supported by price curves.
Theorem B.7. If wij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and j ∈M , then for any ρ < 0, every maximum CES
welfare allocation can be supported by price curves.
Proof. Let x be a maximum CES welfare allocation, and suppose for the sake of contradiction that
x cannot be supported by price curves. Then by Theorem A.2, x cannot be LAF, so either the
allocation or some agent k must be locked. Then Lemma B.1 implies there must exist a,b ∈ Rn≥0
where a ≻≻k b.
For brevity we write ui = ui(xi). Suppose that the utilities in a dominate the utilities in b:
that is, suppose that for every τ ∈ R≥0,
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
(ai− bi) ≥ 0. Then by Lemma B.2, we would have∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)u
ρ
i ≤ 0, and we would be done by Lemma B.6. Thus assume that there exists τ ∈ R≥0
such that
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
(ai − bi) < 0.
We define new weight vectors a′,b′ by
a′i =
{
ai if ui ≥ τ
0 otherwise
and b′i =


bi ·
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
ai∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
bi
if ui ≥ τ
0 otherwise
Note that ∑
i∈N
b′i =
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
bi ·
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
ai∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
bi
=
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
ai =
∑
i∈N
a′i
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Clearly, every agent in a′+b′ appeared in a+b. However, there must be some agent i with ai > 0
but ui < τ , and thus a
′
i = 0:∑
i∈N :ui<τ
ai ≥
∑
i∈N :ui<τ
(ai − bi) =
∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)−
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
(ai − bi) > 0
Therefore the number of agents with a′i+b
′
i > 0 is strictly smaller than the number with ai+bi > 0,
so a′ and b′ involve strictly fewer agents than a and b.
It remains to show that a′ ≻≻k′ b
′ for some k′. We will use two key facts. The first is that since
wij ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j, we have ui = xij whenever wij > 0. This is the crucial use of wij ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus by the definition of a ≻≻k b, we have that for all j ∈M and all τ
′ ∈ R≥0,∑
i∈N :xij≥τ ′
(ai − bi) =
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
′
and wij>0
(ai − bi) ≥ 0
The second key fact is that since
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
(ai− bi) < 0 by assumption, we have b
′
i < bi whenever
ui ≥ τ (along with a
′
i = ai). Thus for any j ∈M and τ
′ ≥ 0,∑
i∈N :xij≥τ ′
(a′i − b
′
i) =
∑
i∈N :τ ′≤ui<τ
and wij>0
(a′i − b
′
i) +
∑
i∈N :ui≥max(τ,τ ′)
and wij>0
(a′i − b
′
i) ≥
∑
i∈N :ui≥max(τ,τ ′)
and wij>0
(ai − bi) ≥ 0
Even though b′i < bi, this inequality might not be strict: in particular, if the final summation
is vacuous. Recall that Mi is the set of goods that agent i cares about. We now need to show that
there exists an agent k′ ∈ N such that for all j ∈Mk′ , there exists τ
′ where the inequality is strict.
This does not necessarily hold for k′ = k, since Mk might have included a good that every agent
with a′i + b
′
i > 0 had zero weight for.
Let k′ be any agent such that b′k′ > 0. Then we know that uk′ ≥ τ . Thus for all goods j ∈Mk′ ,∑
i∈N :xij≥τ
(a′i − b
′
i) =
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
and wij>0
(a′i − b
′
i) =
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
and wij>0
(ai − b
′
i) >
∑
i∈N :ui≥τ
and wij>0
(ai − bi) ≥ 0
The reason the inequality is strict here is that we know there is at least one agent, k′, in the
summation. Thus since b′i < bi for all i ∈ N where ui ≥ τ , the inequality must be strict.
Therefore for all j ∈ Mk′ , the domination is strict at (j, τ). Thus a
′ ≻≻k′ b
′. However, since
a′ + b′ involves strictly fewer agents than the arbitrary a + b we started with, no strong group
domination can be minimal. This contradiction completes the proof.
B.2 Other settings where the maximum CES welfare allocation be supported
In this section, we give two other settings where any maximum CES welfare allocation be supported:
(1) when there are two agents and their weights have the same Lq norm for any single q ≥ 1 or the
same L∞ norm (Theorem B.8), and (2) for any number of agents when
∑
j∈M w
ρ
ij = 1 for every
agent i (Theorem B.9).
Theorem B.8 implies the CES welfare allocation can be supported exactly when agents’ weights
are L∞ normed. This is in contrast to max-min welfare (for any number of agents), where the best
we can could do under the L∞ norm was an arbitrarily close approximation. In fact, the only way
the norm is used in the proof of Theorem B.8 is to show that if a ≻≻k b (without loss of generality,
say a contains only agent 1 and b contains only agent 2), then u1(x1) ≥ u2(x2). One imagines that
this property would hold for any reasonable norm.
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Theorem B.8. Let n = 2, and suppose that either (1) there exists q ≥ 1 such that
∑
j∈M w
q
ij = 1
for both i ∈ {1, 2}, or (2) maxj∈M wij = 1 for both i ∈ {1, 2}. Then for any ρ < 0, every maximum
CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves.
Proof. We use Lemma B.6. Let x be a maximum CES welfare allocation, and suppose for the sake
of contradiction that x cannot be supported by price curves: then Theorem A.2 implies that x is
not LAF, so by Lemma B.1, there exists a,b ∈ Rn≥0 where a ≻≻k b for some agent k.
We can assume without loss of generality that min(ai, bi) = 0 for both i ∈ {1, 2}. By symmetry,
assume that a1 = b2 > 0 and a2 = b1 = 0. This means that a only contains agent 1 and b only
contains agent 2. In order to apply Lemma B.6, we need only show that
∑
i∈N (ai− bi)ui(xi)
ρ ≤ 0.
In our case, this is equivalent to u1(x1)
ρ ≤ u2(x2)
ρ, which is in turn equivalent to u1(x1) ≥ u2(x2).
Recall that for all j ∈ M , xij = ui(xi)wij . Since a ≻≻k b, x1j ≥ x2j for all j, which implies
u1(x1)w1j ≥ u2(x2)w2j . Thus either u1(x1) ≥ u2(x2) or w1j > w2j for all j. However, if agent 1’s
weight vector is strictly larger than agent 2’s on every coordinate, they clearly cannot have the
same Lq norm for any q, which contradicts the assumption.
Theorem B.9. Suppose that wij > 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , ρ < 0, and
∑
j∈M w
ρ
ij = 1 for all
i ∈ N . Then any maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves.
Proof. We again use Lemma B.6. Let x be a maximum CES welfare allocation that cannot be
supported by price curves: then Theorem A.2 implies that x is not LAF, so by Lemma B.1, there
exists a,b ∈ Rn≥0 where a ≻≻k b for some agent k.
Since ρ < 0, g(x) = xρ is a strictly decreasing function. Thus by Lemma B.4, for all j ∈M we
have
∑
i∈N (ai − bi)x
ρ
ij ≤ 0, and for each j ∈Mk, the inequality is strict. Summing over all j ∈M
gives us ∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)x
ρ
ij < 0
We again have xij = ui(xi)wij , and so∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)x
ρ
ij =
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)ui(xi)
ρwρij
=
∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)ui(xi)
ρ
∑
j∈M
wρij
=
∑
i∈N
(ai − bi)ui(xi)
ρ
Therefore
∑
i∈N (ai − bi)ui(xi)
ρ < 0, so Lemma B.6 applies, and this shows that any maximum
CES allocation can be supported by price curves.
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C Counterexamples
agent 1 agent 2
good 1 1 1
good 2 1 0
Example 2: An instance where it is necessary to give a price of zero to some goods (which is a form of
weakly increasing price curves) in order to support the maximum Nash or CES welfare allocation. Assume
each good has supply 1. Nash welfare is maximized by splitting good 1 evenly between the two agents,
and allowing agent 1 to purchase an equal quantity of good 2. This only possible if the price of good 2 is
zero: otherwise, agent 1 is paying more than agent 2. It can be verified that this same allocation is also the
maximum CES welfare allocation for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1). For another interpretation, recall that the
Fisher market equilibrium prices are the dual variables of the convex program for maximizing Nash welfare:
thus the price of good 2 being zero corresponds to the fact that the supply constraint for good 2 is not tight
in this instance.
We showed in Section 6 that if wij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and j ∈M , then for any ρ ∈ (−∞, 0)∪(0, 1),
every maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves. One natural question
is whether this result holds if we only assume that maxj∈M wij = 1 for all i ∈ N . The answer is
no, unfortunately, as demonstrated by the following theorem. Theorem C.1 only rules out ρ in the
range (12 , 1), but we conjecture that counterexamples exist for all ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1).
Theorem C.1. For agents with Leontief utilities where maxj∈M wij = 1 for all i ∈ N , for every
ρ ∈ (12 , 1), there exist instances where no maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by
price curves.
Proof. Consider the following instance with two goods with supply 1, and three agents, whose
weights are given by the following table:
good 1 good 2
agent 1 1− ε 1
agent 2 1 1− ε
agent 3 1 1
Let x be a maximum CES welfare allocation. For brevity, we write ui = ui(xi). In the proof
of Theorem 6.1 given in Section 6, we used duality to show that for a fixed ρ, any maximum CES
welfare allocation x has the form
xij = wij
(∑
j∈M
qjwij
) 1
ρ−1
for some constants q1, . . . , qm ∈ R≥0. Let χi =
(∑
j∈M qjwij
) 1
ρ−1
. In our case, we have
χ1 =
(
(1− ε)q1 + q2
) 1
ρ−1
χ2 =
(
q1 + (1− ε)q2
) 1
ρ−1
χ3 =
(
q1 + q2
) 1
ρ−1
Thus we have xij = wijχi for all i ∈ N and j ∈M . We proceed by case analysis.
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Case 1: (1− ε)χ1 > χ3. In this case, we have
x11 = (1− ε)χ1 > χ3 = x31 and x12 = χ1 > χ3 = x32
So x1j > x3j for every good j. Let a be the vector with a1 = 1 and ai = 0 for i 6= 1, and let b be
the vector with b3 = 1 and bi = 0 for i 6= 3. Then a ≻ b. Furthermore: the domination is strict
at x3j for each good j ∈M . This means that agent 3 is locked. Therefore by Theorem A.2, the x
cannot be supported by price curves, and we are done.
Case 2: (1 − ε)χ2 > χ1. By a symmetrical argument, we have x2j > x3j for every good j, so
agent 3 is again locked, and we are done.
Case 3: (1 − ε)χ1 ≤ χ3 and (1 − ε)χ2 ≤ χ3. This implies that (1 − ε)
ρ−1χρ−11 ≥ χ
ρ−1
3 and
(1− ε)ρ−1χρ−12 ≥ χ
ρ−1
3 . Note that the inequality flipped because ρ− 1 < 0. Therefore
(1− ε)ρ−1χρ−11 + (1− ε)
ρ−1χρ−12 ≥ 2χ
ρ−1
3
(1− ε)ρ−1
(
(1− ε)q1 + q2
)
+ (1− ε)ρ−1
(
q1 + (1− ε)q2
)
≥ 2
(
q1 + q2
)
(1− ε)ρ−1(2− ε)
(
q1 + q2
)
≥ 2
(
q1 + q2
)
ln
(
(1− ε)ρ−1(2− ε)
)
≥ ln 2
(ρ− 1) ln(1− ε) ≥ ln 2− ln(2− ε)
ρ ≤ 1 +
ln 2− ln(2− ε)
ln(1− ε)
Note that the sign flipped in the last step because ln(1− ε) < 0.
The resulting right hand side is some real-numbered value, so whenever ρ is greater than that,
we obtain a contradiction. Taking the limit as ε goes to 0 shows us that the right hand side may
be arbitrarily close to 12 . This shows that for any ρ >
1
2 , there exists an ε > 0 such that in the
above instance, no maximum CES welfare allocation can be supported by price curves.
C.1 Difficulties in analyzing linear utilities
We assumed throughout the paper that agents have Leontief utilities. One natural question is
whether our results extend to other classes of utilities: in particular, linear utilities. The answer is
no, in general. A linear utility function is defined by
ui(xi) =
∑
j∈M
wijxij
where wij is still the weight that agent i has for good j.
Leontief utilities have the very nice property that agents always purchase goods in a fixed
proportion. It does not matter exactly how the cost within each bundle was distributed across
goods, because each agent will always purchase goods in the same proportions, regardless of the
underlying costs. We do not have this luxury with linear utilities. In this setting, the proportions
in which each agent purchases goods depend on a complex interaction between her values for the
goods, and the price curves. This makes it very difficult to reason about what agents will purchase
given a set of price curves. In fact, each agent’s optimization problem
argmax
xi∈Rm≥0: Cf (xi)≤1
ui(xi)
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agent 1 agent 2
good 1 4 0
good 2 0 4
good 3 1 2
good 4 2 1
Example 3: For two agents with linear utilities, group-domination-freeness is not sufficient for the existence
of price curves. Consider the instance where the agents’ weights are given as above and the available supply
of each good is 1. Define x by x11 = x13 = x22 = x24 = 1 and xij = 0 otherwise. This allocation is EF and
GDF. To see that x cannot be supported by price curves, let j˜ = argminj∈{3,4} fj(1). If j˜ = 3, then the cost
of good 3 is at most the cost of good 4, so agent 2 would buy good 3 instead of buying good 4. Similarly, if
j˜ = 4, then the cost of good 4 is at most the cost of good 3, so agent 1 would buy good 4 that instead of
buying good 3.
may not even be convex.
Thus in order for (x, f) to form a price curve equilibrium for linear utilities, a complex set of
conditions would need to be satisfied. We note that Cf (xi) = 1 is still necessary, and so GDF
is still a necessary condition (for strictly increasing price curves), but it is certainly not sufficient
(Example 3).
D Omitted proofs
Lemma 4.1. Given price curves f , xi ∈ Di(f) if and only if both of the following hold: (a)
Cf (xi) = 1, and (b) there exists j ∈M such that for all ε > 0, fj(xij + εwij) > fj(xij).
Proof. ( ⇐= ) Suppose the above conditions hold, but xi 6∈ Di(f). Then there exists x
′
i ∈ Di(f)
such that ui(x
′
i) = ui(xi)+ ε for some ε > 0. Since we assume that xij is proportional to wij, agent
x must receive at least εwij more of each good j in order to increase her utility by ε. Furthermore,
since price curves are increasing, fj(x
′
ij) ≥ fj(xij) for every good j. However, condition (b) of the
lemma implies that there exists a good j such that
fj(x
′
ij) ≥ fj(xij + εwij) > fj(xij)
and thus
Cf (x
′
i) =
∑
j∈M
fj(x
′
ij) >
∑
j∈M
fj(xij) = 1
which contradicts x′i ∈ Di(f).
( =⇒ ) Now suppose that at least one of the two conditions of the lemma does not hold. If
Cf (xi) 6= 1, then either Cf (xi) > 1 and the cost exceeds the budget, or Cf (xi) < 1 so by continuity
agent i could purchase more of every good and increase her utility. Either way xi 6∈ Di(f). Thus
assume that for every j, there exists an εj > 0 such that fj(xij + εjwij) = fj(xij). Then consider
the bundle x′i defined by x
′
ij = xij + εjwij. This bundle has the same cost as xi, but
ui(x
′
i) = min
j∈M
xij + εjwij
wij
> min
j∈M
xij
wij
= ui(xi)
contradicting xi ∈ Di(f).
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that maxj∈M wij = 1 for all i ∈ N . Then for every ǫ > 0, there exists an
allocation x that can be supported by price curves where ΦMM(x) ≥ (1− ǫ)maxx′ ΦMM (x
′).
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Proof. Let w′ij be rescaled versions of wij so that they are Lq-normed for a q to be chosen later.
Specifically, let αi = (
∑
j∈M w
q
ij)
1/q, and let w′ij = wij/αi.
Note that
∑
j∈M w
′q
ij = 1 for all i ∈ N . By Corollary 5.1.1, there exists an allocation with
optimal max-min welfare with respect to weights w′ij that can be supported by price curves. Let x
be this allocation. Then for all j ∈M and all other allocations x′,
min
i∈N
xij
w′ij
≥ min
i∈N
x′ij
w′ij
min
i∈N
αixij
wij
≥ min
i∈N
αix
′
ij
wij
min
i∈N
αiui(xi) ≥ min
i∈N
αiui(x
′
i)
In particular, let x∗ be the allocation maximizing max-min welfare with the respect to the true
weights wij : then mini∈N αiui(xi) ≥ mini∈N αiui(x
∗
i ). Since ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ΦMM(x
∗) by definition, we
have mini∈N αiui(xi) ≥ Φ(x
∗)mini∈N αi.
Therefore for all k ∈ N , αkuk(xk) ≥ Φ(x
∗)mini∈N αi. Therefore
uk(xk) ≥ Φ(x
∗)
mini∈N αi
αk
and so
ΦMM(x) ≥ Φ(x
∗)
mini∈N αi
maxi∈N αi
It remains to show that there exists q ≥ 1 such that mini∈N αimaxi∈N αi ≥ 1 − ǫ. This follows from the
fact that lim
q→∞
αi = (
∑
j∈M w
q
ij)
1/q = 1 for all i ∈ N , which completes the proof.
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